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INTRODUCTION
Scholarship on Muslim law and the law of Muslim nations in the American
legal academy is in a state of considerable crisis that will only loom larger in the
years to come. A different approach is required, one that recognizes the hybrid-
ity of the contemporary Muslim legal experience, meaning that it pays serious
and careful attention not only to the transplanted, positive law of the Muslim na-
tions, but also to the importance of a modem form of pan-national Islamic law in
the shaping of legal and social order in Muslim nations. Using the example of
Iraq, and focusing in particular on commerce, this article attempts to demon-
strate one of the many ways in which pan-national Islamic law and codified se-
cular national law combine to create a pluralist social and legal order in one
Muslim nation.
Much of the leading scholarship in this field of Muslim law-cum-law of
Muslim nations may be divided into two camps. One contingent of scholars is
not attuned to comprehending and engaging the Muslim world as that world ac-
tually exists. This camp prefers instead to limit its study of "Islamic law" almost
exclusively to reconstructions of classical Islamic doctrine, and the means
through which this highly casuistic and theoretical doctrine was created.' For
this group, which comprises of most leading modem Muslim scholars today,
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 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1128293 
84 BERKELEYJ. OF MIDDLE EASTERN & ISLAMIC LAW Vol. 1:1
"Islamic law" is an academic construction, a brooding omnipresence whose rela-
tionship to the social order in Muslim societies is very much a matter of debate.2
This has been challenged recently in an article by Georgetown Professor
Lama Abu Odeh, who alone comprises the second scholarly contingent. Though
Professor Abu Odeh makes some passing references to "hybridity" in her piece,
in the substance of her article she all but dismisses the very notion of "Islamic
law," effectively replacing the term with "the law of the Muslim nations.",3 To
her, the law of the Muslim states is overwhelmingly not based on the shari'a,
the vast body of rules and norms derived from Islamic foundational texts. In-
stead, the law of Muslim states is a transplanted legal code taken from Europe,
in all areas except the law of the family.4 Under such an approach, the Muslim
countries belong in the same legal family as the civil law nations of the Euro-
pean continent and the shari'a is more "trace" or residue than lived reality.
5
This is a deeply unsatisfactory state of affairs. As to the first group of scho-
lars, their approach seems more reflective of the study of shari'a in Islamic stud-
ies departments, a degree that many in our legal academy have.' The view of
Joseph Schacht, perhaps the most influential Islamic studies scholar of the pre-
vious century, was that the shari 'a was a highly idealized legal, moral and ethi-
cal worldview that in important respects bore very little resemblance to actual
legal and social practices in the classical period.7
This is not at all to suggest that all Islamic studies scholars, particularly
those following Schacht, were as convinced of the highly theoretical nature of
the shari' .8 In any event, it is not my intention to attempt to relay, let alone cri-
ticize, the debates within a field that I regard as entirely separate from my own.
Rather, I might only point out that if our leading Islamic legal scholars in this
field are any guide, certainly the notion that the shari'a is some sort of autono-
mous system that is not necessarily connected to reality seems rather uncontro-
versial. Consequently, while our leading scholars may give us much information
about the context surrounding juristic rules of 121h centuryjihad, we know com-
paratively little about the actual practice and rules of classical era war, and even
2. Id.
3. See generally, Lama Abu Odeh, The Politics of (Mis)recognition: Islamic Law Pedagogy
in American Academia, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 789 (2004).
4. Id. at 791-92.
5. Id.
6. To take only three examples, Khaled Abou El Fadl, currently at UCLA, has a doctorate in
Islamic Studies from Princeton. Frank Vogel at Harvard has a doctoral degree in Islamic Law and
Middle Eastern Studies from Harvard, and Sherman Jackson is primarily a Professor of Arabic and
Islamic Studies at the University of Michigan (and an adjunct professor on the law faculty), with a
doctorate in Oriental Studies. This information can be gleaned from the respective websites of the
law schools of UCLA, Harvard University and the University of Michigan.
7. JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 71-85 (1964).
8. See Jorn Thielmann, A Critical Survey of Western Law Studies in Arab-Muslim Countries
in LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE ARAB WORLD 42-45 (Baudouin Dupret, Maurits Berger and Laila al-
Zwaini eds., 1999) [hereinafter LEGAL PLURALISM] (for some discussion on this subject).
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less about the entirely different forms of jihad conducted in the modem world,
and their relationship to the modem law of war.9 We might learn rules on the
nominate forms of contract in the classical world, or rules concerning medieval
financing, but a careful review of these rules demonstrates that they have noth-
ing to do with the practice of Islamic finance,' 0 and in many cases are not an ac-
curate reflection of medieval financing either." The extensive and detailed clas-
sical rules of slavery may be fascinating to discuss and debate, but this will not
change what Professor Bernard Freamon's scholarship has properly pointed out;
namely, that the overwhelming consensus of modem Muslim scholars opposes
the practice of slavery, and that the primary means of slave acquisition in the
classical world violated the "letter, as well as the spirit" of the classical sha-
ria. 12
Beyond the world of Islamic law, I wonder how many in our contemporary
academy would truly describe as "law" a theoretical and academically con-
structed logic system that in important respects diverges wildly from anything
that exists or has ever existed in the actual world. Indeed, a classical theory of
partnerships that nobody bothered to follow in the classical era, a theory of war
that has never been adhered to, and rules on slavery that were, when the practice
of slavery was widespread, consistently ignored hardly seem like anything that
we understand as "law" today. 13 If this is the shari 'a, then it might best remain
in Islamic studies departments.
Moreover, in law school, there is something wrong with addressing the
shari 'a as figurative ideal and not incomparable reality. It would be odd to sup-
pose that Muslims who take the shari'a seriously, and who wish to incorporate it
into the social order of their respective states, believe that its connection to the
practical world should be anything but direct and immediate, that there is some
form of religious legal order that is somehow severable from the manner in
which they seek to live their lives. The insistence of scholars teaching in law
schools and publishing in law reviews to ignore this reality, this contemporary
shari 'a, in favor of a construct of medieval theory, is entirely misguided.
This contingent, desperate as it is to have something to say to the rest of us
in our post 9/11 world, filled with powerful and resilient Islamic movements,
9. Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Muezzin's Call and the Tolling of the Dow Jones Bell: On the
Necessity of Realism in the Study of Islamic Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L., Sec. I. (forthcoming Winter
2008) [hereinafter Hamoudi, The Muezzin's Call]. Cf Sherman A. Jackson, Jihad and the Modern
World, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 1, 10-18 (2002).
10. Hamoudi, The Muezzin's Call, supra note 9, at Sec. Ill. Cf FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL
L. HAYES Ill, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK AND RETURN 37-38 (1998).
11. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 10, at 132 note 4.
12. Bernard Freamon, Slavery, Freedom and the Doctrine of Consensus in Islamic Jurispru-
dence, I I HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1,53 (1988).
13. Professor Freamon has also to his credit only recently pointed out the substantial dissatis-
faction of many modem Muslims with classical rules, with a particular focus on the question of
Qur'anic interpretation. See Bernard Freamon, Some Reflections on Post-Enlightenment Qur'anic
Hermeneutics, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1403, 1420-22 (2006).
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large and small, nationalist and pan-national, violent and democratic, attempts,
at times desperately but never convincingly, to connect Muslim reality to the
academic construct. However, given the very modality of operation (find the
shari'a in the medieval scholarly texts, and connect it somehow to something in
the real world), the effort is impossible. We all know, after all, that the law as
practiced cannot be so simply derived from the "law" as written, particularly
when several centuries separate the two.
As to Professor Abu Odeh's national-centralist approach, the paradox is
immediate and apparent. If the law in our Muslim nations truly belongs in the
civil law family, and the shari'a bears only marginal relevance to the substance
of the law, at least beyond the law of the family, then a question necessarily fol-
lows. What is it that makes the law of the several Muslim nations distinctive as a
collective? That is, what commonalities link Indonesia to Morocco, Djibouti to
Azerbaijan, and Egypt to Brunei? Indonesia has a civil code largely derived
from the Dutch, 14 Egypt's civil code has been developed by Abdul Razzaq al
Sanhuri and is purported to be his own blend of Roman law and Islamic classical
law, 15 and Brunei's commercial legislation is adopted largely from English
law. 16 Other than Islam, and a tenuous adherence to a common, pan-national set
of principles understood to be "Islamic law", what unites these countries' legal
systems? It seems that to the extent that the pan-national shari'a is no more than
trace and of marginal relevance, and to the extent that Islam as a religion has
been privatized and no longer operates in any significant fashion to shape legal
order, then "the law of the Muslim nations" is not in any way a coherent con-
cept, in that the legal systems of the disparate Muslim nations are not meaning-
fully related. Instead, Indonesia should be discussed alongside its Southeast
Asian neighbors, Egypt should be placed in a Middle Eastern legal family, and
Azerbaijan belongs with its fellow Central Asian republics of the former Soviet
Union.
And indeed, such groupings may in certain contexts be entirely sensible. It
would be foolish to suggest that the former Soviet Union Central Asian repub-
lics share nothing by the way of legal culture, or that Indonesia's legal order has
not been influenced by that of Thailand, or Singapore. Nevertheless, the fact re-
mains that the shari'a has a fundamental influence on the manner in which law
and rules are projected in the social orders of Muslim societies. This makes the
study of the shari'a, as a contemporary concept operating in national jurisdic-
tions alongside national law, important in our law schools in this post 9/11 era.
The relationship of this influence on the social order, and on real outcomes in
real disputes in contemporary societies, is central to understanding the operation
14. THOMAS H. REYNOLDS AND ARTURO A. FLORES, Ill, A FOREIGN LAW GUIDE IN
JURISDICTIONS OF THE WORLD: CURRENT SOURCES OF CODES AND BASIC LEGISLATION AT
INDONESIA 1.
15. CLARK B. LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN EGYPT 98 (2006).
16. Reynolds and Flores, supra note 14, at Bnnei 1-2.
LEGAL PLURALISM AND THE MUSLIM EXPERIENCE
of law in much of the Muslim world. This article argues that to understand legal
order in Muslim nations, one must take into account two primary bodies of law.
The first is the national codified law and the second is a contemporary form of
the pan-national shari'a as Muslims understand and approach it. In other words,
the appropriate model is a legal pluralist one, defined for the purposes of this ar-
ticle in the words of Gordon R. Woodman, a premier scholar in the field, as "the
condition in which a population observes more than one body of law."'
17
The interaction of these two bodies of law takes many forms in the Muslim
world, not all of which are pluralist. For example, an approach to codify modem
understandings of shari'a is hardly pluralist per se, in that while shari'a has
been borrowed, it no longer acts as an independent influence. Codification effec-
tively collapses the two bodies of law, shari'a on the one hand and national law
on the other, into one. Moreover, inasmuch as such "borrowing" occurs in the
codification process, outside of Iran, it is almost always done in such a Sunni-
centric manner as to render it entirely illegitimate in the view of the Shi'i world.
This can be shown by the codification methodology employed by Abdul Razzaq
Al Sanhuri, who claimed to have adopted much of Islamic law in drafting his
Civil Codes for Egypt and Iraq that later became the template for the entire
Middle East. 8 Sanhuri's method involved discovering the principles of the sha-
ri 'a through extensive comparative study of the Sunni classical schools and then
using those principles to draft legislation in conformity therewith. 19 There has
been vigorous scholarly debate as to whether or not the Civil Code that emerged
from this process was truly "Islamic," particularly given its suspicious similarity
to Roman law. 20 What is frequently overlooked, however, possibly because
most of this debate has centered on Sanhuri's work in Egypt and not Iraq, is how
fundamentally Sunni-centric this process is.
This is because within Shi'i Islam, the interpretation of the shari 'a belongs
to a select group of high scholars, each termed a mujtahid, with the entire group
collectively referred to as the marja 'iyya. 21 Shi'i lay persons are expected to se-
lect a single, living mujtahid whose rulings on shari'a, contained in a master
17. Gordon R. Woodman, The Idea of Legal Pluralism in LEGAL PLURALISM, supra note 8, at
3.
18. ENID HILL, AL-SANHURI AND ISLAMIC LAW 68-70 (1987).
19. LOMBARDI,supra note 15, at 93-100.
20. Hill, supra note 18, at 71-83 (describing the scholarly debate at length and taking the posi-
tion that the civil code was in fact more Islamic than is commonly believed). Cf J.N.D. Anderson,
The Shari'a and the Civil Code, 1 ISLAMIC Q. 29-46 (1954). See Amr Shalakany, Between Identity
and Redistribution: Sanhuri, Genealogy and the Will to Islamise, ISLAMIC L. & Soc'Y. 201 (2001)
(for a contemporary contribution).
21. Haider Ala Hamoudi, You Say You Want a Revolution: Interpretive Communities and the
Origins of Islamic Finance, 48 VA. J. INT'L. L. 249, 267-70 (2008) [hereinafter Hamoudi, Revolu-
tion]. This article focuses on the dominant (and well nigh exclusive) form of Shi'ism that exists
within Iraq known as Twelver Shi'ism, and all references to Shi'ism should therefore be understood
to be references to that particular form. See Hamoudi, Revolution, supra note 21, at 254 note 19.
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work known as the risala 'amaliyya, they must follow without question. 22 It is
unthinkable within the Shi'i paradigm that a state judge seeking a rule on sha-
ri'a would go beyond an answer provided by the mujtahids2 3 The notion that
shari 'a may be determined from judicial or legislative perusal of classical texts
is therefore entirely rejected in Shi'i Islam.
This point often seems lost on contemporary scholars more schooled in
Sunni Islam than Shi'i. They correctly indicate that the Iraqi Civil Code has a
"gap filler" clause that permits recourse to the shari'a "without limitation as to
school of thought"2 4 to supply a rule where the Code is silent and no rule of or-
dinary custom or usage applies.25 They further indicate, again correctly, that this
methodology was meant to appeal to the Shi'a.26 What is missing, however, is a
discussion of how inadequate such an attempt is within the Shi'i framework.
The entire Code was developed without reference to the views of the marja 'iyya
but rather to medieval Sunni authorities. The notion that thus developed the
Code is "Islamic" in the Shi'i context because it permits reference to Shi'i sha-
ri 'a rules as gap fillers seems highly suspect. It is as if a code were written that
claimed to be Christian, exclusively using sources such as the works of Martin
Luther and John Calvin, and then indicated that, only when the code was silent,
then rulings of the Pope, or of leading Protestant theologians, could be adopted
by the court. It is hard to see how any plausible claim of Catholicity could be
made.
Nevertheless, while the role of generalized shari'a is necessarily limited
when it acts solely as gap filler to a national code, it cannot be ignored entirely.
Any judge choosing to apply shari 'a would necessarily rely on pan-national un-
derstandings.27 This is particularly the case if the judge were to select Shi'i
rules, which would necessarily be taken from one of the several living mujta-
hids, whose rulings transcend national boundaries in that they are adopted by lay
Shi'is from different countries. 28 There is thus some limited level of pluralism in
22. Id.
23. Haider Ala Hamoudi, Money Laundering Amidst Mortars: Legislative Process and State
Authority in Post-Invasion Iraq, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 523, 539 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter Hamoudi, Money Laundering].
24. Al Qanun AlMadani Raqm 40 li sanat 1951 wa ta'deelatihi [Law 40/1951, the Iraq Civil
Code, together with its amendments ] (3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter "IRAQ CIV. CODE"] at art. 1(2).
25. See, e.g., Zuhair E. Jwaideh, The New Civil Code of Iraq, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 176,
181 (1953); Kristen A. Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and the Remaking of the Iraqi Legal Sys-
tem, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L. L. REv. 695, 747-48 (2004); Dan E. Stigall, Iraqi Civil Law: Its Sources,
Substance and Sundering, 16 J. TRANSNAT'L. L. & POL'Y. 1, 15-16 (quoting Jwaideh and Stilt).
26. Jwaideh, supra note 25, at 181; Stilt, supra note 25, at 747-48; Stigall, supra note 25, at
15-16.
27. For an interesting treatment of the role of gap filler clauses and their effects on unfair
terms in contracts clauses and the manner in which they can transcend any single nation-state, see
The Treatment of Unfair Terms in Arab Countries in LEGAL PLURALISM, supra note 8, at 125-32.
28. Hamoudi, Revolution, supra note 21, at 268.
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this process, given the relevance of both the national code and the shari 'a as gap
filler.
In other contexts, the role of shari'a in a pluralistic structure might be
much more pronounced. One such example is where a constitutional provision
requires that legislation be in conformity with the shari'a. Examples of such
forms of pluralism are replete in the Muslim world, appearing in nations as dis-
parate as Malaysia,2 9 Afghanistan,30 Iraq,3 1 and parts of Nigeria.32 In these
cases, the shari 'a is at least technically supreme over the national law, rendering
any dismissal of it as "trace" at least subject to contention.
At other times, questions of supremacy are inexact and in any event inap-
posite to the matter. For example, it hardly seems sensible to wonder whether
state or Islamic regulatory rules are "supreme" in the governance of Islamic fi-
nancial institutions. I have never heard of an Islamic bank that would claim to
flout local law; but, at the same time, it is obvious that Islamic finance operates
internationally according to a set of modem Islamic rules that are by and large
pan-national and that are administered far more by Muslim scholars than state
authorities.33 The modem Muslim law of war is another such example, governed
by both international law and modern conceptions offihad.34
This article focuses on a slightly different plane of interaction between sha-
ri'a and national law, one in which the role of shari'a is pronounced, but in a
less formal capacity than in the examples provided above. It focuses on the par-
ticular case of Iraq, and Shi'i merchants within it. The point is not to demon-
strate any universality to the specific Iraqi experiences I highlight, clearly the
diversity in the Muslim world demonstrates that the interplay of state law to
shari 'a will take a multiplicity of forms depending on context and circumstance.
However, the example is instructive because it is a concrete example of a par-
ticular type of interaction that has been dramatically understudied. 35 Specifi-
cally, this article demonstrates how commercial order in Iraq, and in particular
among specific categories of Shi'i Iraqi merchants, booksellers and textile deal-
ers, has been organized through two central sets of rules and principles. The first
of these influences is the national law, the civil code, drafted by Abdul Razzaq
al-Sanhuri,36 reflecting modern conceptions similar to those prevailing in civil
29. IBRAHIM WARDE, ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 125-26 (2000).
30. AFGHAN. CONST. art. III (not permitting laws that violate Islamic beliefs and provisions).
31. IRAQ CIV. CODE supra note 24, at art. I (gap filler); IRAQ CONST. art. I! (not permitting
laws that contradict the universal tenets ofshari 'a).
32. Ogechi E. Anyanwu, Crime and Justice in Postcolonial Nigeria: The Justifications and
Challenges of Islamic Law of Shari'ah, 21 J. L. & RELIGION 315, 316-17 (2006).
33. See infra Section 11.B for further discussion on this.
34. Hamoudi, The Muezzin 's Call, supra note 9, at Sec. VI.
35. Though understudied, this is not the first paper to focus on the more informal role ofsha-
ri'a in the contemporary context. For another modem example using Syria, see Maurits Berger, The
Shari 'a and Legal Pluralism: The Example of Syria, in LEGAL PLURALISM, supra note 8, at 113-24.
36. Hill, supra note 18, at 68-70.
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law countries in the West. The second set of rules and principles, which is ad-
ministered and enforced on a more informal and localized basis, is the shari 'a as
developed by the Najaf-based clerical authorities.
On their own, clerical notions of economic and commercial order are en-
tirely impossible, for primarily four reasons. First, the rules are imprecise. Sec-
ond, they focus largely on matters of little concern to modem merchants. Third,
they suggest notions of charity and good deeds that are inapposite in the context
of the commercial cultures in question, and finally, they leave significant gaps in
governance. 37 For that reason, transactions in goods among Shi'i Iraqi mer-
chants largely reflect the rules and structures of the Iraqi Civil Code.
However, the rules proffered by the marja 'iyya loom large in two contexts.
First, they are important when the religious rules unambiguously forbid particu-
lar activities that the Iraq Civil Code permits, such as collecting or paying inter-
est on a loan. In these cases, commercial practice follows the central commercial
prohibitions, because violating the shari'a significantly diminishes any realistic
hope of enforcement. This is not to say that debt-based financing is not practiced
in these industries, it most certainly is, but artifices explicitly sanctioned by the
marja'iyya are used, usually to achieve the equivalent of a loan with interest at
extraordinarily high effective interest rates.
The second area where the role of the shari'a is of central importance is
where the shari'a provides rules that are considerably more flexible than the
Civil Code, such as taking security against a debt. Iraqi law requires either a
transfer of a title document or something akin to possession to impose a security
interest, neither of which is convenient in the case of securing portable goods
such as books and textiles. 38 In such cases, commercial actors do not hesitate to
take advantage of the shari 'a's superior attributes, which do not include the state
law requirements, in order to facilitate commerce, knowing that state law provi-
sions will not hinder a merchant's ability to enforce a debt through his security
interest even if state requirements are not met respecting the perfection of the
security interest Thus, it is neither national law nor the shari'a that defines the
commercial order but rather a hybrid of the two, and failure to take either the
modern shari 'a, or the law, seriously, will lead to a fundamental misunderstand-
ing of parts of Iraqi commerce.
I have divided this article into six parts. Part I engages current approaches
to legal scholarship in the Muslim world and highlights the fundamental prob-
lems with these approaches. Part II discusses alternative, hybridic understand-
ings of the manner in which various legal systems combine to operate and con-
trol the Muslim polity, with a special emphasis on the possibilities unlocked by
legal pluralism. Part III outlines Iraqi commercial law and its shortcomings. Part
IV provides a synopsis and critique of shari'a commercial rules as set forth by
the clerical establishment. Part V discusses how these two systems of rule, each
37. See infra Sec. IV.
38. See infra Sec. IV and V.C.
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impossible on its own, create the reality of commercial order in Iraq, drawing on
specific commercial practices in Iraq's bookselling and textile industries. Part
VI offers broader lessons from the exercise.
I
FAILURES OF THE CURRENT PARADIGM
A. Traditional Approaches to Understanding the Shari'a
To understand the crisis in the traditional approach to Islamic law scholar-
ship today and its considerable digression from the manner in which law is gen-
erally approached in the American legal academy, I invite the reader, who I as-
sume to be well schooled in the ways of our academy, to consider the following
counterfactual. Suppose that within our law schools, in our teaching and in our
scholarship, we continued to focus, as the Founders did, primarily on the works
of William Blackstone 39 and Sir Edward Coke 40 and their learned near-
contemporaries. Suppose that Blackstone's Commentaries4' and Sir Coke's Re-
ports and Institutes42 were still our primary pedagogical texts, and the subject of
the bulk of our scholarly endeavors. Suppose again that in evaluating, analyzing
and discussing legal events since that time, we understood them in light of, and
as no more than adjustments to, the pronouncements of the English forbears to
our legal tradition. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act 4 3 would then be viewed as the
codification of the Case of the Monopolies;44 Marbury v. Madison45 understood
as little more than the constitutionalization of Dr. Bonham's Case;46 and James
Kent's Commentaries47 considered the embodiment of the basic principles of
corporate law, with all that followed being nothing more than elucidation of the
39. Concerning Blackstone's influence on the Founders, see Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscover-
ing Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1996).
40. Kevin Ryan, Lex Et Ratio: Coke, the Rule of Law and Executive Power, 31 VER. B. J. 9,
note 4 ("English common law at the time of the Founders was literally Coke's law.").
41. There seems to be broad consensus that Blackstone's Commentaries were very influential
in the United States legal community until the beginning of the 2 0
th century. Alschuler, supra note
39, at 8 (quoting Mary Ann Glendon) ("It would be hard to exaggerate the degree of esteem in which
... the Commentaries were held.").
42. Again, Coke's influence on the evolution of American law is significant. Ryan, supra note
40, at note 4 ("[T]he shape given the law in Coke's Reports and Institutes became the foundation of
legal learning, and the basis upon which the common law developed in England and her colonies, for
the next two centuries.").
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (2007).
44. Darcy v. Allein (The Case of Monopolies), 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (1603) (declaring an exclu-
sive right to produce any good to be unlawful under the common law).
45. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
46. 8 Co. Rep. 114 (Court of Common Pleas 1610) (declaring an Act of Parliament to be in
violation of "common right and reason" and therefore void).
47. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, Lee. 33 (Of Corporations) (1826).
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principles of the likes of Kent, Blackstone, and Sir Coke. Suppose, moreover,
that professors, judges, lawyers, and students were evaluated based on what they
knew about such luminaries. A true doctor of the law would be one who had
written a dissertation on the rules concerning succession of the English kings, or
the nature of the English charters in the United States, or the proper understand-
ing of the positions of Blackstone and Sir Coke on the Magna Carta, or Kent on
the Constitution. Those who could only understand the Sherman Act on its own
terms would be dismissed as tradesmen, vocational law-mechanics who barely
understood the true functions and nature of the law. What might result from an
adoption of this unusual, or perhaps, more aptly phrased, traditionalist, para-
digm?
Naturally, this is an impossible question to answer with any degree of reli-
ability, but if I might indulge the reader in further speculation, honed through
the benefit of the somewhat comparable Muslim experience, I might suggest that
a likely consequence would be a significant scholarly devaluing of nearly all le-
gal developments that occurred after the passing of the supposed Golden Era of
the luminaries of the law. Citations to modem case law and modem statutes
would be limited, supplanted in large part by references to 17th century English
case law involving situations bearing little resemblance to the issue before the
court. Those who might dare to point out the absurdity of drawing reference to
dead jurists who lived in markedly different times and social contexts would be
dismissed and derided. The works of Kent, or Blackstone, or Sir Coke, would be
considered "authoritative" and "true" law, irrespective of what the actual prac-
tice or administration of law might be, now or then. To the extent that the
learned were asked to opine on a matter of contemporary importance, say the
Enron scandal, they would begin their inquiry with the Commentaries, and make
whatever connection they could to the modem world, however tenuous or per-
plexing to those unindicted into the scholarly priesthood. If they could not make
the requisite connection, the implication would be that they did not really under-
stand "American law."
There is no need to dwell any further on my rather fanciful hypothetical,
which was only intended in any event to provide for the reader a highly general-
ized framework within which to understand the status of current Islamic law
scholarship. The point is, that while there may be considerable intellectual value
in understanding Sir Coke in his context, and Ibn Taymiyya in his, the value of
Islamic legal scholarship in an American law school is suspect, if what one is
referring to is the historical construction of an entirely foreign body of law with
no necessary application anywhere, and possibly at any time, beyond our ivory
towers. Students enrolling in our courses would want to learn about Bin Laden's
jihad, and would instead learn of 1 1th century Shaft 'i legal theories that Bin La-
den may never have heard of, and, given some of his statements, probably would
not care about even if he had.48 Journalists would call our offices wanting to un-
48. It is striking the extent to which Bin Laden is supremely unconcerned with classical theo-
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derstand the origins of "profit sharing" within Islamic financial institutions, and
we could only recite classical rules which, if taken even remotely seriously,
would effectively end modem commerce as we know it. 49 Fellow scholars
would wish to engage in comparative work across legal jurisdictions, and we
could provide them with little more than centuries-old juristic tomes.
This is not law as we understand it in our academy. This is not even legal
history, in many cases the rules bear no resemblance to medieval reality, let
alone modem. Classical rules ofjihad presume a preposterous polity wherein the
Muslim world, the "House of Islam," is united and happily led by a single ca-
liph, engaged in eternal hostility against infidels, the "House of War," and, po-
tentially, illegitimate insurrectionist rebels.50 Needless to say, this is far from an
accurate reflection of any historical period. To take another example, Professor
Vogel labors to explain to us the shari'a rules on partnerships, and then indi-
cates, correctly, that these rules are so impossible that it is hard to believe that
even the medievals lived by them.5' So what did they do? What, in other words,
was the law concerning partnerships? Professor Vogel has no idea, and suggests
more work needs to be done to investigate.5 2 Theory thus not only precedes
practice, it supersedes it.
If this is "Islamic law," then there seems to be precious little reason to pur-
sue it in an American law school, given how little there is that demonstrates this
field's relevance to the actual legal order. Perhaps realizing this, and certainly
aware that the world is looking to them to say something important about the
shari 'a in these difficult times, leading scholars make desperate attempts to link
their academic knowledge to current realities that are entirely unconvincing,
and, indeed, distorting to the very processes they claim to comment upon.
One common way in which this is done is to essentially ignore the exigen-
cies of the modem world, except at the very end of the analysis. The way to find
out, according to Professor Abou El Fadl, if democracy is compatible with Islam
is to review the juristic texts and provide an answer, leaving the actual reality of
the Muslim experience to the side. Professor Abou El Fadl is wise enough to
know, and to indicate, that political considerations and social context cannot be
ignored when approaching such questions as the possibility of constitutionalism
ries ofjihad, famously remarking that those who engaged in the attacks of 9/11 did not follow the
fiqh as that term is commonly understood (meaning the learned rulings of the classical scholars) but
instead followed the learned rulings of the Prophet himself FEISAL DEVJI, LANDSCAPES OF THE
JIHAD 13 (2005) (quoting Bin Laden). Bin Laden's contempt for the notion that the scholars of the
classical period are the authoritative voices of what Islamic law is in our times is made apparent in
this statement; he is clearly suggesting that the learned classical doctors have in fact departed from
the Prophet's rulings and should be abandoned.
49. Hamoudi, The Muezzin's Call, supra note 9, at Sec. 11 (describing classical rules of fi-
nance).
50. MAJID KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 51-53 (1977). See also Sher-
man A. Jackson, Jihad and the Modern World 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 1, 15-18 (2002).
51. VOGEL and HAYES, supra note 10, at 132 note 4.
52. Id.
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or democracy in the Muslim world, yet insists on limiting himself to the doc-
trinal issues in more than one of his works. 53 Thus, for example, Professor Abou
El Fadl says he does not wish to discuss the Arab-Israeli crisis, which after all is
precisely such a modem, political consideration, and laments what he considers
to be an overemphasis on it among scholars and students in American law
schools. 54 Professor Abou El Fadl further indicates that he does not address this
subject at all in his classes on Islamic law. 55
Those of us educated in the post-Realist world, less enchanted with the in-
fluence of the opinions of Sir Coke or Ibn Taymiyya, as the case may be, on the
outcomes of contemporary legal disputes, find this baffling. How can one dis-
cuss jihad, constitutionalism, or democracy while avoiding current political re-
alities? Are we truly to believe that the blinding rage that has permeated the
Muslim world as a result (Whether justifiably or not, I leave the reader to con-
clude and offer no opinion of any kind) of the Arab-Israeli conflict is less influ-
ential in forming modem Muslim notions of modem political order than aca-
demic theories of classical jurists who most Muslims have never heard of? Are
not these political conditions going to control and shape understandings of Mus-
lim history and Muslim doctrine far more than nuanced interpretations of me-
dieval jurists? As a result, is this entire insulation of "politics" from "law" serv-
ing to clarify modem Islam or modem Muslims? Or is it obfuscating that world
in misguided deference to our own constructions of juristic theory, which may
well have absolutely no salience in the broader Muslim world?
Indeed, in some cases the focus of some excellent scholars on medieval
theories is somewhat damaging and distorting to otherwise admirable attempts
to describe the modem era. Professor Clark Lombardi has written an excellent
book on the jurisprudence of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court con-
cerning Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, which requires all laws to be in
conformity with shari'a.56 The work suffers, regretfully, from only one basic
failing: its unnecessary attempt to link classical era rules and political theories to
current attitudes towards the shari'a, as if one evolved from the other despite the
vast changes that have taken place in Egypt from the medieval period to the
modem.
Professor Lombardi indicates that the Court's theory concerning compati-
bility with shari 'a is that legislation must neither contradict "absolutely certain"
rulings of the shari'a, nor what are referred to as its "universal roots" and "gen-
eral goals."57 This is suspiciously similar to his description, several chapters ear
53. Khaled Abou El Fadl, Constitutionalism and the Islamic Sunni Legacy, 1 UCLA J.
ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 67 (2001) [hereinafter Constitutionalism]; KHALED ABOU EL FADL, ISLAM
AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY 4 (2004).
54. Abou El Fadl, Constitutionalism, supra note 53, at 44.
55. Id.
56. LOMBARDI, supra note 15, at 125.
57. Id. at 180.
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lier, of medieval theories of siyasa shar 'iyya, wherein the jurists seek to control
the actions of the political authorities through ensuring that the rules neither vio-
late its "universally applicable" principles and precepts, nor its goals. 58 Thus is a
link thereby suggested between the classical theories of the medievals on the one
hand, and modem notions of judicial review on the other. Professor Lombardi
does not deny and indeed discusses at some length the changes that have taken
place in Egypt in the past millennium. 59 However, these changes do not seem to
have any significant bearing on the methological approach to the shari'a, which
appears to be, from classical to modem, precisely the same, or at least largely
similar-identify "certain" rulings, and core goals, and allow to the sovereign
control over all else.
The only problem is that the Court's application of its principles is, to say
the least, inconsistent. Turning to the first prong of the two part test (the certain
rulings of the shari 'a), the Court declares, for example, the taking of interest on
a money loan to be "universally condemned" and an "uncontested divine rul-
ing." 60 This simply is not true. There is significant classical authority within the
Maliki school of thought to suggest that delayed trades of money with gain (as
opposed to gold and silver) is permissible. 6' The Court nowhere discusses this,
or explains precisely how it came to determine the "universal" nature of the pro-
hibition. Professor Lombardi indicates that the Court has in fact found "very
few" rulings that fit within the ban of universal applicability, 62 in which case the
determination in this case is all the more surprising. It seems as if a consistent
methodology, linked in some meaningful way to the classical era, is elusive.
When we turn to second prong of the test, and the Court's primary focus,
which is to evaluate laws on the basis of the "goals" of the shari 'a, the hope of
finding methodological consistency connected to classical era political theory
evaporates. 63 The goals, as articulated by the Court and as set forth most fa-
mously by the 1 2th century jurist Abu Hamed al-Ghazali, and repeated by count-
less others both classical and modem, are the protection of religion, self, reason,
honor and property. 64 The Supreme Constitutional Court is not the first entity to
cite to these, and Professor Lombardi is not the only person to focus so heavily
on these principles. Scholars throughout our law schools repeat these goals, as a
58. Id. at 54.
59. Id. at 78-118.
60. See Rector of the Azhar University v. President ofthe Republic, Judicial Year No. 1, Case
No. 20 (Sup. Const. Ct. 1985) (Egypt), reprinted in W. M. Ballantyne, Supreme Constitutional Court
(Egypt) - Shari'a and Riba, I ARAB L.Q. 100, 102-03 (1985).
61. See Hamoudi, The Muezzin's Call, supra note 9, at lIl.D.
62. LOMBARDI, supra note 15, at 188.
63. Id. at 188-89.
64. Id. at 191. In fact, Ghazali's list is slightly different, including instead life, familiar honor,
property, religion and mind. Anver Emon, Natural Law and Natural Rights in Islam, 20 J. L. & REL.
351, 368 (2005).
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means to demonstrate that the shari 'a has remained constant in spirit throughout
the ages.65
The only problem being that this standard is devoid of content, 66 which
probably helps to explain its enduring appeal. Certainly, Al Ghazali's rumina-
tions on the subject, which use these goals to defend punishments for adulterers,
fornicators, consumers of alcohol, heretics and apostates, hardly seem to be what
most modem Muslim scholars, or the Supreme Constitutional Court, have in
mind. 67 Ghazali's further indication that no society that truly sought to "serve
creation" would forgo punishments for such odious behavior as drunkenness,
adultery, fornication and disbelief in God likewise seems supremely unhelpful.68
No doubt those admirers of Ghazali in our academy will respond with a more
nuanced and careful reading of him than I have given, and no doubt Islam's con-
servative defenders will use the sections I point out above to argue in favor of
Islam's inherent hostility to any form of liberalism. Ultimately, the point is that
with the goals of the shari'a being continually articulated as nothing more than
the phrase cited above, virtually any position can be plausibly defended as being
in service of the goals.
Professor Lombardi, sympathetic as he is to the Court, desirous as he is to
find some sort of connection to classical theory, and reluctant as he is to simply
describe the jurisprudential nonsense with which he is faced as being nothing
more than outcome driven and results oriented, endeavors mightily to make
some sense of this. He divides the goals into two types. 69 First, there are the spe-
cific goals, relating to benefits arising from an ambiguous text as opposed to an
"absolutely clear" one. Second, there are the general goals, which include the
items listed above, as well as others that are as of yet unspecified. 70 The former
are used to advance particular social results that the shari'a is, in the opinion of
the Court, supposed to promote. 7' For example, an ambiguous Qur'anic verse to
treat women with "kindness" has been interpreted by the Court to validate legis-
lation requiring the payment of alimony.72 Other conclusions, to say the least,
might be drawn from the ambiguity. As to the latter type of goals, for the rea-
65. See, e.g., Abou El Fad], Constitutionalism, supra note 53, at 101, Asifa Qureishi, Inter-
preting the Qur'an and the Constitution: Similarities in Text, Tradition and Reason in Islamic and
American Jurisprudence, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 67, 101-02 (2007); Emon, supra note 644, at 367-68.
66. Professor An Naim shares this view of mine, though his own characterization is far kinder
than I have allowed. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN NAIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE 35 (2008)
("the problem ... is that the so-called basic objectives of the shari'a are expressed at such a high
level of abstraction that they are neither distinctively Islamic nor sufficiently specific for the pur-
poses of public policy and legislation.").
67. Emon, supra note 654, at 368.
68. Id.
69. LOMBARDI, supra note 15, at 192-96.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 192-93.
72. Id. at 193.
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sons discussed above, even the sympathetic Professor Lombardi deems the
process of identifying and applying them to be "inescapably subjective. 73
I might go one step further. Whatever the bases of the Court's decisions
are, they are not grounded in the meaninglessness of the specific or general
goals of the shari'a. The Court's articulation of shari'a in our times must be
based on something else entirely. Ibn Taymiyya may be the rhetoric, but some-
thing else is the cause. If I were to guess from the cases provided, it appears to
be a desire of the Court to advance liberal values on the basis of shari 'a (hence a
ruling concerning the requirement of alimony), but not to such an extent as to
lose significant credibility among traditionally minded shari'a advocates (hence
the description of the riba prohibition as necessarily encompassing interest on a
loan). A thorough explanation is yet to be made.
In some ways, I have been unfair to Professor Lombardi, who does recog-
nize that the Court's approach can be subjective,7 4 who does describe outside
influences on decision-making (particularly in the context of the riba prohibi-
tions),75 and who recognizes that the Court is driven by a desire to modernize
and moderate the shari'a so that it is consistent with international human rights
norms.7 6 Nevertheless, I cannot help but feel that one might understand more of
what the Court is doing, and what it might do in future cases, if in place of at-
tempting to define a coherent methodology (that somehow evolved from medie-
val classical political theory), more attention were paid to the modern political,
social, and economic circumstances that drive the Court to make the decisions
that it does respecting the content of the shari'a and less to a supposed methodo-
logical evolution that seems difficult to identify.
These are only examples, many others abound.
B. Islamic Law as the Law of the Muslim Nations
Professor Abu Odeh's retort has been along the lines of another extreme.
She focuses extensively on the actual provisions of the various Muslim nations
to demonstrate, accurately, their considerable distance from the classical sha-
ri'a.77 She points out, again accurately, that the law in Muslim nations is based
on national legal codes, and that secular legal education and secular, national
judiciaries are the norm. She indicates that Muslim societies do not reflect some
fantastical worldview wherein the spirit of the medieval world haunts them.78
She is deeply critical not only of Islamic law scholars, but also of comparatists,
73. Id. at 198.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 165 (pointing out the difficulty in convincing the broader Egyptian public that mon-
ey interest did not fall within the riba prohibition).
76. Id. at 7-8. The liberal nature of the Court's determinations is a consistent theme of the
work.
77. Abu Odeh, supra note 3, at 791-92.
78. Id. at 793-803.
2008
98 BERKELEYJ OF MIDDLE EASTERN & ISLAMIC LAW Vol. 1:1
in refusing to acknowledge the legal realities of the modem Muslim world, and
the obvious dichotomy between historic, Muslim law and the law of the Muslim
world.79
Though it might be heresy within Islamic law circles to say so, there is
much to commend in Professor Abu Odeh's work. I assign her most commonly
discussed article on this subject to my students each year in my Islamic law se-
minar, as a useful corrective to the fascination with medieval juristic rules, that,
I emphasize again, are not and in some significant cases, have never been, the
basis upon which Muslim societies have organized themselves. Yet, Professor
Abu Odeh's provocations appear to prove too much. For if there is no pan-
national set of ideas, no shari 'a, however modem, that plays a significant role in
the creation of legal order in and across Muslim societies, then what, precisely is
the "law of Muslim nations?" The subject is not worthy of study, one may as
well discuss the "law of nations beginning with the letter M." It is only Islam,
and Islamic legal ideas, that could possibly link these disparate legal systems as
a collective.
Once one ponders the question deeper, further problems emerge. What of
the law of the personal status? Abu Odeh neatly sidesteps these questions, em-
phasizing that the law in the overwhelming majority of Muslim states bears little
relation to the shari 'a except in matters of personal status. 80 Nevertheless, these
matters, which encompass the law of the family and inheritance and wills, are
hardly trivial and suggest broad reference to binding pan-national legal concepts
that transcend the jurisdiction in question. What of Islamic financial institutions
and the important regulatory function exercised by their shari'a review boards,
staffed by non-lawyer clerics and responsible for determining the Islamicity of
any proposed transaction in which the institution wishes to engage? What of the
communiques of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which is com-
prised of the world's Muslim majority nations? Are not these suggesting a desire
on the part of Muslim nations to announce a particularly Muslim international
law position on any given issue? What set of principles do pan-national militant
jihadists follow if not those of the shari 'a? What sustains the Muslim-wide pop-
ularity of movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah save the belief that they are
engaging in lawfuljihad?8 1 Can all of this truly be "trace?"
It seems that what is required in order to understand legal order in the Mus-
lim world is a new approach entirely. This approach must neither render the
study of Muslim law an entirely incoherent endeavor nor sanctify an academic
construct whose relationship to reality is highly suspect. Each of the shari'a, as
understood by modem Muslims, not academics, and the national law, has a role
to play, and it is the interaction between the two where the true nature of law in
the Muslim world begins to reveal itself.
79. Id. at 808-24.
80. Id. at 791-92.
81. All of these examples are discussed in more detail in Section III.
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II
LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE MUSLIM EXPERIENCE
A. Shari 'a and State Legislation
There are a variety of means through which pan-national shari'a binds the
various Muslim nations and acts in a pluralistic fashion with national law as the
means through which legal order is maintained. The first, and most obvious, is
the projection of shari 'a onto the formal legal order. This can be done in any va-
riety of ways. One is to codify particular shari'a provisions, most popularly
family law provisions,82 but other provisions have been codified as well, among
them criminal sanctions 83 and prohibitions on money interest. 84 An argument
can be made that this is hardly proof of the projection of any pan-national
norms, as the law, whatever its origin, is a state code administered by state offi-
cials according to state processes that in no way transcend the state. 85 This is
true, and as indicated above, the methods often used to codify shari 'a are so for-
eign to the structure of Shi'ism that they can hardly be considered "Islamic" in
the Shi'i framework. However, the laws that do purport to adopt at least part of
the shari'a almost always suggest recourse to shari'a in interpretation.86 It is
hard to believe that any judge would, in trying to decide what the shari 'a indi-
cated about a certain matter, consider himself confined to interpretations that
arose within his national boundaries, particularly since shari 'a texts, medieval or
modem, make no reference to the Muslim nation states. 87 I do not mean to sug-
82. It is generally agreed that the personal status law, while largely codified, is purported to
derive from classical doctrine, though it is inevitably modified, as any "code" taken from such dif-
fuse classical sources would be. BERNARD WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 188 (2005); Hamou-
di, The Muezzin 's Call, supra note 9, at Sec. IL.A
83. Anyawanu, supra note 32, at 316-17 (respecting parts of Nigeria); Syariah Criminal Of-
fenses (Federal Territories) Act of 1997, No. 559 available at 4 YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND
MIDDLE EASTERN LAW 571 (1998) (concerning parts of Malaysia).
84. Law for Usury (Interest) Free Banking (amended 1987), available at
http://www.irtp.com/laws/the%201aw%20for%20usury%20free%20banking/index.asp (last visited
April 26, 2008) (law of Iran respecting money interest).
85. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 82, at 188.
86. This can be done through the enactment of a code and an indication that where the code is
silent, shari'a shall prevail. See, e.g., Egyptian Personal Status Code art. 3 (as amended, 2000),
available at http://www.egypt.gov.eg/arabic/laws/personal/introduction.asp (last visited April 26,
2008) (in Arabic) (indicating resort to Hanafi Islamic Law when the code provides no specific tex-
tual provision); Iraq Personal Status Code, Law No. 188 of 1959, art. 1(2) (reference to general sha-
ri 'a, without specifying any particular school of thought). However, at other times, the code provides
almost no specificity beyond an indication that shari 'a shall apply with respect to the law of the fam-
ily. See, e.g., 9 Modem Legal Systems Cyclopedia § I.4(A) (Malaysia); The Muslim Personal Law
(Shari'at) Application Act of 1937, (India) available at
http://www.indiacode.nic.in/fullactl.asp?tfnm=193726 (last visited April 26, 2008).
87. While medieval jurists would naturally make no mention of the modem nation states that
did not exist in their era, modem shari 'a recitations are largely the same. See generally, e.g.,
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gest strict uniformity in shari 'a interpretation across all Muslim nations, but I do
mean to emphasize that interpretive methods and approaches can transcend the
several Muslim jurisdictions.
It could be argued, however, that in the vast majority of cases where the
shari 'a is supposed to act as a "gap filler," outside of family law at least, its in-
fluence is exceedingly slight, and in practice rarely serves as the basis for deci-
sion. This might be the case with respect to Sanhuri's Civil Code, for example.88
It might also be true of numerous other laws throughout the Muslim world,
where the law seems so foreign to the shari 'a that one has a difficult time imag-
ining how shari'a might ever be relevant, except at the margins.89 Certainly, in
my own experiences with Arab judiciaries, I have not seen very much reference
to the shari 'a beyond the family law when interpreting national codes.
However, there are other examples of pluralism where that presumption
seems entirely inappropriate. It is becoming increasingly popular for nations to
adopt a constitutional provision that requires that all legislation be in conformity
with the shari'a, or at least its universal tenets or principles. 90 I have already
mentioned that Professor Lombardi has done extensive work on this subject in
the context of Egypt. While I have been somewhat critical of Lombardi's ap-
proach, his work makes clear that the Supreme Constitutional Court refers to a
variety of concepts and ideas in determining what the shari'a is, none of which
is in any way linked to the nation-state. 9' Of course, the Egyptian Supreme Con-
stitutional Court may very well be distinctive in the manner that it applies the
shari'a; to ignore national particularity is to obscure the nature of the national
judicial process. At the same time, however, to exalt the national code as the
sole determinant of legal outcome, when in fact the Court is drawing on a pan-
national set of concepts and ideas that other national courts with similar provi-
sions may draw upon, is no less distorting.
MUHAMMAD ABU ZAHRA, MAUSU'ATAL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI [THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAMIC RULES]
(1967). See also Baudouin Dupret, What Is Islamic Law: A Praxiological Approach and an Egyptian
Case Study 24 THEORY, CULTURE & SOCIETY 79, 91 (2007) (quoting an Egyptian court adopting a
rule taken from Abu Zahra). This piece by Professor Dupret is in fact extraordinary in its efforts to
define the shari'a through lived experience rather than decontextualized reference to medieval text.
88. See, e.g., IRAQ CIV. CODE No. 40, supra note 24 (195 1); EGYPTIAN CIV. CODE No. 131,
art. 1 (1948).
89. A complete list would be extensive indeed. Suffice it to say, that it is not unusual for even
the most secular seeming of laws, for example the commercial law of highly developed Bahrain, to
contain in it a provision permitting recourse to shari'a. See Bahrain Trade Law No. 7 art. 2 (1987).
90. Egypt amended its constitution in 1980 with this result. LOMBARDI, supra note 155, at
133-34 (requiring conformity with principles of shari'a). Both Iraq and Afghanistan included a sim-
ilar provision in their respective constitutions. IRAQ CONST. art. 2 (2005) (requiring conformity with
universal tenets); AFGHAN. CONST. art. 3 (2004) (requiring conformity with the provisions of the
sacred religion of Islam).
91. Id. at 159-256
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B. Transnational Shari 'a Projection
Another manner in which the shari'a acts with secular state and interna-
tional regulatory structures is through the creation of international networks and
institutions whose regulation is subject to state or international legal control, but
is also self-governed by jurists setting forth modern conceptions of shari'a. In
these instances it is senseless to talk of "supremacy," as each is of central impor-
tance. The premier example of this is Islamic finance. Quite clearly, what is and
is not acceptable in the context of an Islamic financial institution is determined
by non-state religious authorities just as much as state regulatory agencies. 92
These religious authorities make determinations as to which forms of con-
ventional finance structure are permissible, and which fall within entirely mod-
em conceptions of traditional Islamic prohibitions. 93 A variety of organizations,
institutions, and networks continually develop these regulations as the practice
matures, from the shari'a review board of each Islamic financial institution (or,
in the case of global institutions like HSBC, the review board responsible for the
Islamic banking division), to more global institutions like the Islamic Fiqh
Academy of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). 94 The rulings
and determinations of these organizations are largely binding in the Islamic Fi-
nance community. An excellent recent example of this can be found in the con-
cern over the supposedly equity based Islamic bond known as the sukuk,95
which arose when Muhammad Taqi Usmani, a cleric with no current position of
official authority in any nation, criticized its use as being fundamentally un-
Islamic in some instances. 96 The entire practice has been, in the words of one
reporter, "thrown for a loop" by Usmani's criticism, even though the bonds have
absolutely no direct effect on any state regulatory body anywhere.97 As this ex-
ample illustrates, clerics and pan-national Islamic law exert significant control
over the practice of Islamic finance.
State regulation plays an important role in Islamic finance as well, and re-
gional discrepancies can exist. 98 Some states even have independent regulatory
92. VOGEL and HAYES, supra note 10, at 47-49.
93. Id.
94. Id. See also Website of HSBC Islamic Banking Division, available at
http://www.hsbcamanah.com/1/2/hsbc-amanah/ (last visited March 1, 2008).
95. The sukuk are supposed to be instruments that earn a return based on the profits arising
from the underlying venture they are financing. However, most sukuk in the market effectively fix
their returns by offering any excess profits over a specified percentage to the venture as a reward,
and make up for any shortfalls from the same specified percentage through non-recourse interest free
loans to be repaid from any future profits exceeding the specified percentage. The result is, in eco-
nomic terms, a fixed interest bond. See generally Mufti Taqi Usmani, Sukuk and Their Contempo-
rary Applications (ruling on file with author).
96. Id. (objecting to the repurchase conditions as well as the non-recourse interest-free loans
that are common in sukuk).
97. Sebastian Abbot, Islamic Bonds Hit By Scholar, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2008.
98. IBRAHIM WARDE, ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 112-31 (2000).
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structures to govern Islamic finance institutions,99 and certainly every institution
I can think of would claim to be in full compliance with all applicable national
laws and regulations. But being in full compliance with state regulations is
clearly not enough, compliance with broader Muslim expectations is also fun-
damentally important, as the sukuk example shows.
Pan-national jihad is another example of the manner in which international
law and shari'a have been combined in a pluralistic fashion to create a modem
Muslim law of war that is in many ways distinct from the traditional paradigm.
On the one hand, it is clearly the case that many modem jihadist movements,
and certainly the most popular, derive their legitimacy not only from the Muslim
law, but also from thoroughly modem (though of course controversial) concep-
tions of national liberation. Hamas and Hezbollah are the most obvious exam-
ples of these movements.100 These Islamist organizations often refer to their
struggles not as jihad, but instead use the more modem term muqawama, or re-
sistance. 101 Thus, both nationalist liberation ideology and Islamist militancy are
in play.
Moreover, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, comprised of the
Muslim nations of the world, has announced a position, which may be fairly
called the "Islamic" position, which specifically exempts the activities of the
Lebanese and Palestinian resistance movements from any definition of terror-
ism. ' 02 The OIC suggests that under international law, there is an exception for
terrorism when legitimate struggles against colonialism, alien domination and
foreign aggression are involved. 03 Much of the rest of the world is unwilling to
accommodate such an exception, resulting in an impasse at the United Nations
towards the adoption of a single standard. 104 Thus, we see how modem notions
of shari'a, as pan-national Muslim law, have resulted in the articulation of an
Islamic position on terrorism that is so at variance with the position of most of
the rest of the world that the United Nations cannot agree on an appropriate po-
sition.' 0 5 The notion that this international legal position of the Muslim nations
is not a form of Muslim law, or, if it is, it is not terribly important, seems impos-
sible to sustain.
This is not to say that international law may be ignored. As noted above,
the OIC explicitly indicates that its position is derived from international law,
even though most of the rest of the world disagrees. In any event, the tension is
99. Id. at 123-28 (describing Malaysia).
100. Hamoudi, The Muezzin's Call, supra note 9, at Sec. VI.
101. Id.
102. Kuala Lumpur Declaration on International Terrorism, OIC, arts.10-12 (hereinafter "Kuala
Lumpur Declaration") (April 1-3, 2002).
103. Id. at art. 8.
104. See Ad Hoc Committee Negotiating Comprehensive Anti-Terrorism Convention Opens
Headquarters Session, U.S. FED. NEWS (Feb. 5, 2007) (describing 0IC position and indicating that
this important issue remains outstanding).
105. Id.
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clear. The Muslim nations wish to abide by two sets of principles; the first, a
modem notion of jihad that is the vehicle for Islamic and nationalist resistance
to Zionism, colonialism and imperial aggression (all of which are treated as a
single epiphenomenon), and the second, the rules of international law as set
forth in the UN Charter. Both are relevant to the international order in the Mus-
lim world, neither is supreme over the other, and it is the combination of the two
that therefore best defines the pan-national Muslim order.
C. Informal Ordering and the Shari 'a
A third way in which the shari'a and national law can combine to create
legal order in the modem Muslim nation-state is in situations where the projec-
tion of the shari 'a is less formal and official. This is of particular importance in
matters of commerce, where actors can readily "opt out" of the formal legal sys-
tem, or at least parts of it, in order to settle their own disputes in their own man-
ner. Enforcement of any determination using a dispute resolution mechanism
unrecognized by the state might be "voluntary" in the sense of not necessarily
being state-enforced, but surely hardly a matter of choice should the commercial
actor wish to remain within the system.
An excellent example of this is the diamond industry, as Lisa Bemstein has
shown in a justifiably acclaimed article, where the administration, regulation,
and enforcement of rules is entirely internal and self-governing.106 Unlike Pro-
fessor Bernstein's diamond sellers, however, who have "systematically rejected"
state law,'0 7 Shi'i Iraq's merchants and traders rely on a blend of both state law
and shari'a, as articulated by the Shi'i clerical establishment in Najaf, in order
to establish commercial order. This is because neither system contains sufficient
levels of both functionality and legitimacy on its own.
As will be shown in the next two sections, each system provides a unique
set of characteristics. The state law quite often provides more clarity than reli-
gious law. '08 Its rules tend to be more developed and comprehensive, and it is
better organized and appears more modem than religious law. I09 Under the reli-
gious system, the rules of commerce are piecemeal, disjointed, and difficult to
understand, much less follow. "0 Many of the more detailed rules could not pos-
sibly be of relevance to the vast majority of modem commercial actors." 1 Some
106. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations In the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 115 (1992).
107. Id. at 115.
108. See infra Sec. Ill.
109. Id.
110. See infra Sec. IV.
111. See, e.g., ALl SISTANI, MINHAJ AL-SALIHEEN, available at
http://www.sistani.org/local.php?modules-nav&nid=2&bid=24 (last visited April 26, 2008) (in Ara-
bic) [hereinafter MINHAJ] §§219-31 (dealing with trades of items that few commercial actors would
ever seek to trade). In referring to contemporary juristic rules, I focus on the work of Grand Ayatol-
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rules seem taken from another era, such as the rule requiring that a person may
not enter into a contract until he or she has reached the age of bulugh (pu-
berty). 112 In this confusion, the default practice is to defer to the Civil Code to
set the form, structure, and general rules of commerce.
On the other hand, among Shi'i merchants, particularly those in the textile
and book industries, the Civil Code leaves areas of concern for the pious, par-
ticularly where it permits activities, such as the taking of money interest,
113
which the shari'a as developed by the clerical establishment unambiguously
prohibits. 114 Though commercial actors could technically avail themselves of
Iraqi courts to enforce payment of owed interest, they would prefer cheaper and
easier to obtain forms of relief, none of which are available in the case of money
interest because of the broad hostility of the devout population to such an open
flouting of the shari'a rules. As a result, artifices explicitly sanctioned by the
clerical establishment are preferred.
In addition, the shari'a often provides flexibility where the national civil
code does not. For example, within Shi'ism, there is no requirement of posses-
sion or title documentation to obtain a lien. 115 In such instances, even if judicial
enforcement is impossible, the shari'a is preferred because its lack of compre-
hensiveness can in important respects provide actors room to operate and infor-
mally enforce practices that are more convenient than those that state law per-
mits.
Commercial actors in Iraq, particularly Shi'i merchants in the textile and
book industries, thus employ a blend of the two systems, following national law
as a general matter with important exceptions. This ensures some clarity to the
regulation of commercial order (provided by national law) as well as legitimacy
(provided by the religious law), flexibility (often provided by the religious law),
and ease of enforcement (provided by both systems working together).
III
THE IRAQ CIVIL CODE AND COMMERCIAL ORDERING
It is not my purpose to attempt to recite in any level of comprehensiveness
or detail the provisions of Sanhuri's magnificent Civil Code. One author has
done so recently to admirable effect, i16 and thus the effort would not only be
tangential to the focus of this article, but also redundant. However, five observa-
lah Sistani, who is the most prominent and popular of the mujtahids in Iraq, and possibly the world,
today. See Linda Walbridge, Introduction: Shi'ism and Authority in THE MOST LEARNED OF THE
SHi'A: THE INSTITUTION OF MARIA' TAQLID I I (Linda Walbridge, ed.) (2001) (arguing that Sistani
is the most popular of the world's mujtahids).
112. Id. at §62.
113. IRAQ CIV. CODE, supra note 24, at art. 692.
114. MINHAJ, supra note Ill,at§§1011-1013.
115. See infra Sec. IV for more detail with regards to this matter.
116. See generally Stigall, supra note 25.
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tions, relevant to the carrying out of commerce in the textile and book industries
in Iraq, are worthy of delineation.
A. The Code and Modernity
First, the Civil Code is modem. Perhaps the best manifestation of this is in
its creation of a general theory of obligation and of contract, in contradistinction
to the classical Islamic law.17 and to contemporary Shi'i juristic rules.'' 8 The
shari 'a under these systems does not recognize any general contract theory, but
rather discusses contract in the context of various nominate forms, such as sales,
leases, agencies and partnerships. 19 This is also reflected in the first attempted
codification of Sunni Islamic law, the Ottoman era Majella. 120 Sanhuri, relying
to some extent on his own tendentious readings of the classical texts and his
gleaning of "principles" from them, changed this and adopted a largely Roman
and civilian approach to obligation.' 21 As a result, Articles 73 to 505122 of the
Civil Code provide rules on obligations generally, and Articles 73 to 183 deal
with contracts specifically, including contract requirements and forms, capacity,
the vitiation of the agreement for fraud, duress and mistake, void and voidable
contracts, interpretation, enforcement, and the like. 123 Similar rules concern not
only contracts but other forms of obligation as well, most obviously, obligations
arising out of tort. 1
24
More than anything else, this creation of general rules and a general theory
of contract and obligation sets Sanhuri's code apart from its predecessors by
providing a clear set of rules under which contracting parties are expected to
conduct themselves. In addition, a general theory of contract permits signifi-
cantly more flexibility in the structuring of transactions, as it enables the parties
themselves to decide how they wish to organize their mutual obligations to each
other, rather than requiring adherence to any one of a series of rigid nominate
117. Hamoudi, The Muezzin's Call, supra note 9, at Sec lI.B. See also infra notes 118-121.
118. See generally MINHAJ, supra note 11l, at vol. 2 (dividing what would normally be consid-
ered "contracts" into separate sections, each dealing with different nominate forms, among them
sales, leases, types of partnerships, loans and the like, with only the briefest of descriptions for con-
tracts generally).
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., MAJELLA, art. 103 (defining contracts in the most highly general terms); arts
167-403 (sales); arts. 404-611 (lease/hire); arts. 612-700 (suretyship); arts. 701-761 (pledges).
121. LOMBARDI, supra note 155, at 98; Hill, supra note 18, at 68-70.
122. IRAQ CIV. CODE, supra note 24, at arts. 444 to 505, all of which related to evidence of ob-
ligation, were later replaced with the Evidence Law.
123. See generally, id., at arts. 73-183.
124. A theory of obligations subsumes both contract and tort (as well as other matters). How-
ever, in keeping with the focus of this Article, and so as not to confuse the common law reader with
the civil law notion of the nature of "obligation," I emphasize the theory of contract contained in the
Civil Code.
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forms. 125 Such uniformity, flexibility and clarity facilitates modem commercial
transactions considerably. 1
26
Moreover, Sanhuri's code recognizes the concept of juridical personhood
for companies, 127 which, when combined with the limited liability principles set
forth in the Company Law, results in a thoroughly modem set of rules concern-
ing ownership and liability. 128 It grants persons over the age of eighteen the abil-
ity to enter into contract. 129 Consistent with the general theory of contract, it
permits the creation of contracts over anything that does not conflict with law or
public morals. 130 It emphasizes that in the interpretation of the contract, a pri-
mary focus be on the intent of the contracting parties, not the form of the trans-
action, or the lexical structure. 131 All of these are central to most modem, devel-
oped notions of contract.
B. Comprehensive Nature of the Civil Code
A second observation is that the Code is comprehensive. Much like any ci-
vilian code, it deals with a broad panoply of matters, including not only general
theories of obligation, but also specific rules governing types of contracts and
125. This certainly is the view of a premier commentator on the Iraqi Civil Code, Professor Ab-
dul Majeed Al Hakim. Professor Hakim suggests that the notion that the will of the parties should
control the nature and structure of the transaction is built on modem, philosophical bases concerning
the normative importance of individual freedom, the same bases that undergird the current emphasis
on human rights. DR. ABDUL MAJEED AL-HAKIM, PROFESSOR ABDUL BAQI BAKRI AND ASSISTANT
PROFESSOR MUHAMMAD TAHA BASHIR, AL WAJIZ Fi NADHARIYAT AL-ILSTIZAM Ft'L QANUN AL-
MADANI AL-IRAQI [NUTSHELL ON THE THEORY OF OBLIGATION IN THE IRAQ CIVIL CODE] 20
(1980). However, one need not embrace entirely Professor Hakim's seemingly Spencerian notions of
the importance individual economic freedom to recognize that central to modem commercial sys-
tems is the idea that parties may, with limited exceptions, structure any transaction they please in any
manner that they see fit.
126. For his part, Dean Sanhuri compared the importance of a general theory of obligation in
the Civil Code to the importance of a spinal cord in a human body. ABDUL RAZZAQ AL-SANHURI, 1
AL-WASIT FI SHARH AL-QANUN AL-MADANI AL-JADEED [A COMMENTARY ON THE NEW CIVIL
CODE] 126 (Beirut 3d. ed. 2000). There is some scholarly literature that suggests that the classical
insistence on nominate forms did not in any way render it primitive or undeveloped. See, e.g.. Con-
tracts in Islamic Law: The Principles of Commutative Justice and Liberty, 13 J. ISL. STUD. 257
(2002) (arguing that the classical system enabled the realization of commutative justice and liberal-
ity). This may well be the case, and it is not nor has it ever been my project to cast an unfair and
anachronistically contemptuous light on Muslim classical law. However, it is fair to say that in the
contemporary world, given broad contemporary understandings of the nature of contract, commer-
cial actors would find it nearly impossible to navigate in a world in which their various agreements
would have to be fit into one of several rigid, nominate forms, with specific rules attaching as to
each form.
127. IRAQ CIV. CODE, supra note 24, at arts. 47-60.
128. See IRAQ COMPANY LAW, arts. 6-8, available at http://www.br-
iraq.com/PDF/LawonCompanyNo2 I of2004/English/LAWNo2 I.pdf (last visited April 26, 2008).
129. Id. at art. 106.
130. See id. at art. 75.
131. Id. atart. 155
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torts, as well as rules concerning property, conflicts of law over property and
persons, insurance, and mortgages and other forms of security.132 With the ex-
ception of a specific exemption for matters of personal status (such as marriage,
divorce, and inheritance), which are governed by a Personal Status Code and
whose derivation from shari'a appears much more direct, the Iraq Civil Code is,
like almost any Civil Code, the primary source of the rules of private law and
seems no less comprehensive in its scope. 133
C. The Code and Islamicity
Third, the Civil Code takes some cognizance of Islam and the shari'a. It is
far from the purposes of this Article to join in the seemingly interminable debate
as to whether or not Sanhuri's Civil Code is truly Islamic. This is particularly
because, as noted above, the answer is clearly that it is not, as far as the Shi'a are
concerned, and the focus of this article is on Shi'i practice. Nevertheless, it
would be a mistake not to point out that the Code's provisions do to some extent
root themselves in an Islamic context. For example, the definitions of juristic
persons include clearly Islamic entities such as the waqf perhaps best translated
(reductively) as a Muslim trust.134 The shari'a is given a limited role as a "gap
filler" as we have noted above.' 35 A property right known as the tasarruf de-
rived from classical Sunni law with no obvious analog in Roman law and con-
cerning the right of private parties to develop the lands of the 'amir, or sultan,
(the 'amiri lands) is specifically recognized with its own unique rules and limita-
tions.136 The term "'amiri land" remains in the Civil Code despite the obvious
fact that there is no 'amir and thus effectively the term refers to state property.
The rules concerning loans deal not only with money, but also with items
weighable or measurable by volume,"' categories developed by Shi'i jurists
138
and Sunni jurists of the Hanafi and Hanbali schools. 139 Thus, even if the Civil
Code is not "Islamic," it must fairly be said that its respect for, and occasional
adoption of, Islamic rules and Islamic terminology is a matter scarcely in doubt.
132. See generally IRAQ CIV. CODE, supra note 24.
133. See generally QANUN AL AHWAL AL-SHAKSIYA RAQM 188 LI SANAT 1959 WA
TA'DEELATIHI [Law 188/1959 of Personal Status, Together with Its Amendments] (7 h ed. 2000) [he-
reinafter "Personal Status Law"]; see also Hamoudi, Revolution, supra note 21, at 544-45.
134. IRAQ CIV. CODE, supra note 24, at art. 47(e).
135. Id. atart. 1(1).
136. Id. at arts. 1169-1248.
137. Id. at art. 690.
138. MINHAJ, supra note 11I, vol. 2, at §217.
139. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 10, at 75.
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D. Necessary Revisions to the Code
Fourth, the Civil Code is in desperate need of revision. While it is compre-
hensive and modem, a number of provisions require some level of updating,
now that more than half a century has passed since its enactment, and the world
has become considerably more globalized and commercially interdependent.
Unfortunately, particularly given Iraq's isolation over the past thirty five years,
this has not been done. The most obvious area in which some level of reform is
vitally necessary, as Mark Sundahl points out in a recent article, concerns the
taking of security on loans. 140 The Civil Code effectively requires, for all objects
to be secured other than real property, that the lienholder take possession of the
object itself.14 ' This has been relaxed somewhat by the Trade Law, which per-
mits the taking of security if title documents pass to the lienholder, or if the lien-
holder assumes some sort of apparent possession. 142 These provisions are help-
ful, but not in cases (such as, for example, the taking of security as against a
current book or carpet inventory) where title documents do not exist. Moreover,
precisely what constitutes apparent possession is unclear. In an age where the
obtaining of security has become, for better or for worse, progressively easier,
Iraq is quite literally stuck in the 1950's.
Other anachronisms remain. The Civil Code does not address issues con-
cerning foreign companies or persons very thoroughly. They are mentioned in
the conflicts section 43 and in the determination of the domicile of persons,'44
for example, but the provisions are limited and vague. Many of them deal with
less prominent issues such as marriage to foreigners, 4 5 inheritance from for-
eigners, 146 or the devising of property under a foreign will. 147 The rules on
choice of law, extremely important for modem commerce, are particularly con-
fusing. One Article provides a series of rules as to which law must apply to
"contractual obligations," but then adds "unless the parties otherwise agree or
circumstances make clear that another law must be applied."' 148 What circum-
stances? In case of a conflict between the parties' choice and these undefined
"circumstances," which controls? No guidance is given. Another Article indi-
cates that the "form" of the contract is subject to the law where the contract was
140. See Mark Sundahl, Iraq, Secured Transactions and the Promise of Islamic Law, 40 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1301 (2008).
141. IRAQ CIV. CODE, supra note 24, at art. 1322(1).
142. Qanun Al Tijara, Raqm 30 li sanat 1984 [Trade Law, No. 30/1984], art. 187.
143. See IRAQ CIV. CODE, supra note 24, at arts 14-23.
144. Id. at arts. 34-60.
145. Id. at art. 19.
146. Id. at art. 22.
147. Id. at art. 23.
148. Id. at art. 25(1).
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put into effect (tammatfih).149 This latter Article seems entirely pointless, and
potentially could undermine any choice of law provision in a contract.
A choice of forum or the concept of large international arbitrations is most-
ly unrecognized in the Code,' 5" and foreign judgments cannot be enforced
unless applicable Iraqi law grants them the power to adjudicate the matter. 151
The world of multinational corporations, contracts spanning jurisdictions, alter-
native dispute mediation, and recognition of foreign arbitral awards is largely
foreign to this Civil Code, drafted long before these developments had become
significant.
E. The Civil Code and the Shari 'a
Finally, the Civil Code contains one central provision that is deeply prob-
lematic from a shari 'a perspective. This is Article 692, which permits the taking
of interest on a loan. ' 5 2 Sanhuri describes at great length how the taking of inter-
est on loans can be reconciled with classical Sunni thought, 153 but the effort has
failed to convince the world's Islamic movements, even as they have adopted
other modem ideas that depart substantially from classical conceptions, among
them Sanhuri's general theory of obligation. 1
54
Interest on loans remains a central target of Muslim protest, less because of
its classical origins, given how much of classical contract law is ignored, and
more because the founders of the Islamic economics movement, who were also
the founders of Islamic political protest, saw in the taking of interest a moral les-
son that distinguished their own polities from those of the West. 155 Leaders such
as the Shi'i Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and the Sunni Sayyid Qutb, tapping into a
theme of anti-colonial, regional liberation fervor that lasts to this day, castigated
Muslim societies for acceding to Western notions of finance in permitting inter-
est. ' 56 They called for nothing short of an economic and political revolution in
these societies, to bring them back to their proper, Islamic roots.
149. Id. at art. 26.
150. The section of the Civil Code dealing with international conflicts of forum neither contains
a choice of forum clause, nor the possibility of international arbitration. Id. at arts. 15-16. It indicates
that Iraqi courts must decide all disputes in connection with contracts concluded or performed in
Iraq. ld. at art. 15(c). In this vein, it should be noted that Iraq is not a party to the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, commonly known as the New York Con-
vention. See Status 1958 - Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConven
tion-status.html (last visited April 26, 2008).
151. See IRAQ CIV. CODE, supra note 24, at art. 16.
152. Id. at art. 692.
153. Abdul Razzaq al-Sanhuri, 3 MASADIR AL HAQQ FIL FIQH AL-ISLAMI at 234-36, 240-43.
154. Hamoudi, The Muezzin's Call, supra note 9, at Sec. III.D.
155. Id. at See. IV
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Interest, they argued, was cruel and rapacious; it permitted the rich to in-
crease their wealth on the backs of the poor. Moneyed classes will lend to de-
fenseless borrowers, and guarantee for themselves a return with no risk at all, a
sure form of oppression. 157 In the place of such exploitative debt, the fundamen-
talists argued, Islam calls for the creation of institutions and instruments that are
based on social justice, mutuality, and sharing. The shameless lender who offers
one dirham and demands two later is destructive of social harmony and the Is-
lamic brotherhood, as he makes an enemy of his borrower. 158 Instead, capital
and labor should partner together to earn profits, an idea that Sadr takes so seri-
ously that he calls for a ban on all hired labor, at least with respect to raw natural
wealth, notwithstanding Muhammad's hadith clearly in favor of hired labor
generally. 159 Sadr is unconcerned with the hadith, alternatively describing it as
illegitimately derived, or if legitimate, taken out of its proper context. 160 It is ap-
parent that Sadr's interest lies not in adherence to foundational text in any for-
mal sense but rather in the creation of a new Muslim order that is uniquely Is-
lamic, thoroughly just, and contradistinct and separate from that of the broader
global community.' 61
IV
JURISTIC RULES OF COMMERCE
As with the discussions of the Civil Code in the previous section, it is not
my purpose to provide any sort of detailed summary of all of the rules of com-
mercial transactions provided by the Najaf mujtahids generally, and by Grand
Ayatollah Sistani in particular, on whom I focus because of his broad influ-
ence. 162 Rather, some observations on the rules of commerce, particularly rele-
vant to the nature of commerce in Shi'i Iraq, are in order.
A. Relationship to Civil Code
The first and most obvious observation is that the religious rules lie in ten-
sion with the state law, neither in direct conflict nor in absolute harmony. As
with all Grand Ayatollahs, 163 the subject matter of Sistani's master work, the ri-
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. SAYYID QUTB, AL-ADALAH AL-IJTIMA'IYYAH FIL ISLAM [SOCIAL JUSTICE IN ISLAM] 102-
03 (15th prtg. 2002).
159. Id. at 103.
160. Id.
161. To be clear, I do not introduce these economic notions to demonstrate their accuracy, but
rather to show the type of expectations that modem Muslims have with respect to Islamic finance.
162. See generally MtNHAJ, supra note 111.
163. See generally, e.g., GRAND AYATOLLAH ABU'L QASIM AL KHU'I, MINHAJ AL-SALIHEEN
(1992) (risala of Grand Ayatollah Khu'i, the predecessor of Grand Ayatollah Sistani).
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sala 'amaliya, makes clear that its purpose is to guide the believer on how to
live her life in accordance with God's Will. 164 As a result, matters of public law,
over which the believer has no direct control, are left unmentioned, 165 and mat-
ters of worship, over which the believer has entire control, are discussed in great
detail.166 In neither case does this create much of a problem. It is in the area in
between, the realm of private law, where the tension occurs.
In setting forth rules of private law, whether they be tort rules such as those
concerning usurpation, 167 property rules such as treatment of abandoned prop-
erty or fallow land, 168 contract rules concerning sales or prohibited forms of
gain, 169 or personal status rules concerning marriage, divorce and inheritance, 170
the state, and its different sets of rules, is simply not mentioned. No guidance is
given as to how to negotiate between the state law and religious rules.
This causes some confusion. If various rules of property are to be based on
the religious rules, for example, what does one do to reflect changes of owner-
ship? If to procure a security interest over property, possession is not necessary
even if preferred as a matter of precaution, 17 then how does one register a secu-
rity interest, in light of the fact that the religious institutions neither have nor
seek to have any sort of separate administrative capacity to effect such registra-
tions? As discussed in Section V, Sistani's reluctance to say anything on these
subjects leads to a great deal of ambiguity, which in turn provides much ground
for flexibility.
B. Lack of Comprehensiveness
The religious rules seem more designed to develop particular matters of in-
terest to the jurists with sufficient levels of certainty than to provide a compre-
hensive guide to how commerce should be conducted. Thus, for example, where
the Civil Code would contain an entire set of rules relating to the interpretation
164. See generally MINHAJ, supra note I 1l.
165. This is not to say that Grand Ayatollah Sistani has no interest in Iraqi public law, a subject
worthy of an article on its own. Clearly the Grand Ayatollah has involved himself in Iraqi constitu-
tional and election processes on more than one occasion, though it is equally clear that he has no
interest in juristic rule. See Hamoudi, Money Laundering, supra note 23, at note 67. However, irre-
spective of his occasional forays into public law, the Grand Ayatollah has provided no set of rules
under which the state must operate, no theory to describe the nature of the interaction, and no guid-
ance as to when deference to the state is necessary or appropriate. This is certainly not the case with
respect to private law matters, as the text makes clear.
166. Id.
167. MINHAJ, supra note 111, vol. 2 at §§806-89.
168. Id., vol. 2 at §§762-805; §§890-918.
169. See, e.g., id., vol. 2 at §§51-61 (concerning rules of sales); §§217-35 (concerning prohib-
ited forms of gain).
170. See, e.g., id., vol. 3 at §§30-56 (concerning marriage); §§473-562 (concerning divorce);
§§988-1074 (concerning inheritance).
171. Id., vol. 2 at §1031.
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of contract,172 the religious rules have no comparable sections. There are broad,
interpretive references suggesting that if one party, for example, handed over a
particular item to another with the intention of providing it as security, then a
mortgage is thereby secured.1 73 But as to how to interpret the words of a con-
tract generally, what role custom and usage should have, whether parole evi-
dence may be admitted for purposes of interpretation, none of these issues, so
fundamental to modem contract theory, are described with any level of preci-
sion.
Also absent are any notions of juridical personhood for companies, making
it unclear whether a person may Islamically form a company, and if so, whether
that company may enter into an agreement. There are no rules on limited liabil-
ity even if such companies were to exist. There is no section concerning poten-
tial conflicts of rules, meaning that the status of agreements with non-Shi'is in
particular is uncertain. Arbitration, mediation, or other forms of dispute resolu-
tion are not thoroughly discussed. Simply stated, it would be impossible to use
the religious rules as a system of commercial governance absent considerable
elaboration from another source of authority.
Finally, quite often it is difficult to know precisely what the consequences
are if a party simply acts in contravention of the religious rules. Returning once
again to placing a security interest on property, the rules provide ample guidance
on how security is to be treated if the property is pledged twice with the consent
of both parties. 174 However, what is omitted is what is to be done if the pledgor
provides the property twice without the consent of both parties; that is if he frau-
dulently fails to inform one or both parties that there is another pledge on the
property. Because there is no registration mechanism in the religious system
through which interests can be recorded, the UCC Article 9 rules on priority
175
might be hard to replicate, but surely something else is required if this law is to
work. The reasons for this particular omission seem clear enough; the religious
rules have limited, even if supremely effective in many cases, means of en-
forcement. That is, the mere indication of a prohibition is, at least within the
context of finite and largely closed merchant communities, probably sufficient
to prevent any party from violation. A bookseller seeking to borrow money and
offer his inventory on lien is most likely going to be unable to seek financing
beyond other merchants, and they will be able to ascertain relatively quickly
whether or not another one of them has already procured a security interest.
However, the lack of a broader enforcement mechanism does limit the potential
scope of these rules.
172. IRAQ CIV. CODE, supra note 24, at arts. 155-67.
173. MINHAJ, supra note 111, vol. 3 at § 1028. See also § 1004 (same rules concerning loans).
174. Id. supra note I 11, vol. 2 at § 1043. Basically, they then have equal rights as pledgees.
175. See WILLIAM D. WARREN & STEVEN D. WALT, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY 118-19 (7 th ed. 2007).
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C. Vestiges
While the rules as to how to interpret a contract are by and large absent,
one can learn in almost mind numbing detail the manner in which animals may
be sold, live or butchered, in pieces or whole, at a slaughterhouse or retail, the
consequences of the illness of the animal and so forth.' 76 Even more detailed
(and more irrelevant) rules surround the purchase of fruits and vegetables off of
trees or while still growing. ' 7  Trades of items such as wheat and barley for each
other are examined in detail, as are loans of similar items, while rules concern-
ing currency exchanges, far more important to modern commerce than anything
dealing with wheat or barley, are dealt with summarily. 1
78
The rules find it necessary to prohibit loans of alcohol, or pork, as if two
Muslims pious enough to consult Ayatollah Sistani's rules to determine Islamic-
ity would ever think to make a loan in the form of a pig. 179 While other exam-
ples abound, these should demonstrate the considerable irrelevancy of great por-
tions of the rules of the religious authorities to modem commercial actors.
D. Anachronisms
Some of the religious rules seem impossible to take seriously in modern
times. The most glaring example concerns capacity. As with numerous other ar-
eas of Islamic law, capacity is determined at the onset of what is known as bu-
lugh, understood to be nine lunar years of age for a girl, and fifteen for a boy un-
less the signs of puberty, such as pubic hair and wet dreams, appear before
then. ' 80 It is very difficult to believe that commercial actors in the contemporary
era, no matter how pious, are going to permit questions of capacity to hinge on
such matters as wet dreams and pubic hair. It is even harder to believe that ten
year old girls will be considered competent in most merchant societies to trans-
act business on their own. Certainly nothing in my experience in Iraq led me to
conclude that anyone thought that a child this young was capable of making
sound business decisions.
Thus, inasmuch as such matters are concerned, an alternative source of
rules is often preferred.
176. MINHAJ, supra note 11l, vol. 2 at §§299-303.
177. Id. at §§272-98. These rules arise from a classical prohibition concerning speculation
known as gharar that remains relevant in Islamic finance.
178. MINHAJ, supra note 11l, vol. 2 at §§272-98. Only the last two rules of trades with gain
deal with paper money, id. at §§234-35, while a plethora of rules surround if and under what circum-
stances wheat may be traded for dates, or barley for wheat, or beef for chicken, or sheep for goat,
and the like. Id. at §217-31. Unsurprisingly, at least in my experience observing Iraqi commerce,
such in-kind trading was exceedingly rare, and commercial actors relied as much on currency there
as they would anywhere else in purchases and sales.
179. ld.at§1007.
180. Ali Sistani, Q&A, definition of bulugh, available at http://www.sistani.org/local .php
?modules=nav&nid=5&cid=424 (in Arabic) (last visited April 26, 2008).
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E. Commerce and Charity
Consistent with the underlying principles of "Islamic economics" espoused
by revolutionaries such as Sadr and Qutb, the religious rules constantly make
reference to the need to provide brotherly succor and aid, and to imply a form of
economic order that is based as much on mutual cooperation and support as on
the pursuit of individual self-interest.' 81 For example, the first rule in the section
on loans states that taking loans is disfavored, though not prohibited, except in
cases of need. 182 The less the need the stronger the disfavor, and the more the
need the weaker the disfavor, until the disfavor disappears entirely. 183 The next
rule indicates that the granting of a loan is strongly favored as a charitable act,
and then cites statements of the Prophet Muhammad as well as Ja'far al-Sadiq,
the sixth of twelve Infallible Shi'i Imams,' 84 that indicate that believers who
give loans to fellow believers in need will have angels praying on their behalf
and will have their own needs removed in the current world and in the Hereaf-
ter. 185 Another quoted statement of Ja'far al-Sadiq compares favorably the sup-
port of a believer to the support of a brother. 186 These "rules" are provided be-
fore any specific guidance is given on the manner in which loans may be given
or received, the form they must take, and the structural principles underlying
them. Unsurprisingly, however, as the discussion on loans continues, it becomes
amply clear that interest in any form or variety, whether it be the payment of ad-
ditional money, the procurement of a service or the enjoying of the usufruct of a
possessory lien, is prohibited in the context of a loan. 187 If, after all, a loan to a
fellow believer is equivalent to a loan to a brother, and loans are limited to those
in need, then it is hard to imagine activity more odious and distasteful than for a
person to offer$ 100 to his own brother in desperate need, on condition that $150
be returned later.
F. Formalisms and the Religious Law
Finally, the religious law relies on a great deal of formalism, particularly in
matters of commerce. Thus, keeping with the example of the previous section,
181. See supra Section III.E for more detailed information concerning "Islamic economics."
182. MINHAJ, supra note 111, vol. 2 at § 1002. The shari'a generally classifies any particular
action into five categories: required, favored, neutral, disfavored and prohibited. SHERMAN
JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF SHIHAB AL-DIN
AL-QARAFI 117 (1996).
183. MINHAJ, supra note 111, vol. 2 at § 1002.
184. The Imamate within Shi'ism was the institution holding exclusive authority over Islamic
doctrine following Muhammad's death. In Twelver Shi'ism, the dominant form of Shi'ism in Iraq,
there are twelve Infallible Imams, with the twelfth under Shi'i eschatology having gone into hiding,
to return near the end of times. Hamoudi, Revolution, supra note 21, at 264-66.
185. MINHAJ, supra note lll, vol. 2 at §1003.
186. Id.
187. Id. at§§1011-13.
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while the granting of a loan cannot be accompanied by any form of gain whatso-
ever, there is a separate issue if the loan is conditioned on a separate sale. That
is, clearly the lender, as a condition of his loan of 100 bushels of wheat, cannot
demand the repayment of 105 bushels in a year's time. Can he, however, loan
105 bushels, on condition that five of these bushels are sold back to him imme-
diately for some relatively low amount, thus effectively lending 100 bushels
immediately for a repayment of the full loan of 105 bushels in a year's time?
Sistani dismisses this ruse as being within the types of gains that are prohib-
ited. 188 But what if instead a separate property, not the bushels themselves, are
sold by the borrower for less than its market value, or what if 100 bushels of
wheat are lent to the borrower, on condition that he buy five more bushels for
the price of ten, payment and delivery to be made in one year? Sistani is more
hesitant, and indicates that these do not fall within the gain stipulations, 189 pre-
sumably because they involve sales separate from the loan. He does suggest that
prudence cautions avoidance of such artifice, clearly designed to thwart the pur-
pose of the prohibition on gain, but in language that implies that such matters
are disfavored, not prohibited. 190 It is hard to see why this type of trade is treated
differently than a loan, except in the barest formalist sense-one involves a loan
and a benefit derived thereof and the other a loan and a separate sale.
By contrast, once the world of debt and loan is left behind, and the transac-
tion in question becomes a "sale," the rules on trades with gain become much
more permissive. The sale of an item measurable by weight or volume for a lar-
ger amount of the same item in the future is still prohibited, as a form of imper-
missible gain akin to a loan with an increase.'91 As for trades of different items
measurable by weight or volume, the rules are complex, confusing, and, as Sec-
tion IV.C shows, largely irrelevant. 192 Almost nobody in the modem world ef-
fects trades of goats for sheep, or wheat for barley; cash is the universal medium
of exchange. This is fortunate, because the rules respecting commercial paper
and money, neither of which are measurable by weight or volume, are surpris-
ingly permissive, permitting the "sale" of one currency for the "purchase" of a
higher amount of a different currency in the future, so long as the currencies are
not the same. 193 This practice is not disfavored in any way. 194 That is, assuming
an exchange rate of 1500 Iraqi dinars to the dollar, a trade of 100,000 Iraqi di-
188. Id.at§1014.
189. Id.
190. See id. Sistani's words are 'fa la yatruk al ihtiyat al ijtinab minhu, "or "prudence does not
relinquish the avoidance of such things." id. When Sistani wishes to prohibit something, the terms
are either "yuhram" ("it is prohibited"), or "alahwat luzuman alijtinab anhu" ("the more prudent
course necessarily is its avoidance") id. at §992 (emphasis mine). Without the term "necessarily,"
the clear implication is permissible, though disfavored, conduct.
191. Id. at 217.
192. See supra note 178 and references cited therein.
193. MINHAJ, supra note 11l, vol. 2 at §234.
194. Id.
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nars for 150,000 dinars to be paid in the future would be prohibited, but a trade
of $100 for 100,0001D to be paid in the future is entirely acceptable.' 95 Other
than forcing both sides to assume a currency risk, it is hard to see precisely what
this achieves that money interest does not. Certainly it seems to thwart all of the
high minded language cited earlier of the benefits of charitable loan giving and
the absolute prohibition of benefits associated with loans. On the other hand, as
discussed in the next section, such formalistic exemptions are embraced by
commercial actors who are then able to engage in debt based transactions with-
out serious restriction.
V
IRAQI MERCHANTS AND THE HYBRIDITY OF THE COMMERCIAL EXPERIENCE
In nearly two years in Iraq, from the summer of 2003 to the summer of
2005, through the intercession and persistent questioning of friends and rela-
tives, I was given ample opportunity to inquire into and observe Shi'i merchant
practices 196 in two primary retail industries, textiles and books, in Baghdad and
to a lesser extent Basra. I do not claim that the means of financing within these
industries is necessarily representative of broader areas of commerce, either
within Iraq or beyond it. I provide no statistics (because I am virtually certain
none exist) respecting the size of these industries, either in absolute terms or rel-
ative to other areas of domestic Iraqi commerce, or even of their nature. Given
the circumstances prevailing in Iraq, a study that seeks to make any sort of sta-
tistical claim respecting the importance or scope of the practices I describe here-
in, or other Islamic forms of commerce, cannot seriously be attempted at this
time. I would assume that industries of a similar nature in Iraq (for example, sel-
lers of foodstuffs), would act similarly to those I describe herein, but I have
nothing but supposition and the barest anecdotal evidence to support such a
claim.
As a result, rather than make broad or highly generalized claims, it is my
intent to describe one particular area of practice with which I have become fa-
miliar to shed light on the manner in which the devout might approach questions
of Islam and law. Precisely how any industry in any country seeks to navigate
between shari'a and law will depend on any number of factors, the uniqueness
of any given, individual Muslim practice is undeniable. However, that many do
so navigate, and neither live in a world of medieval jurists nor of entirely privat-
195. Id.
196. In neither location were the merchant classes, at least at the time I observed them, com-
posed exclusively of Shi'is and quite clearly some of the commercial practices described did tran-
scend sect. Nevertheless, because the scope of the Article concerns Shi'i law, I focus exclusively on
the nature and form of dealings within the Shi'i merchant class. Indeed, as Iraq's sectarian divide
widens, limited focus of this sort may prove to be increasingly relevant to any description of Iraqi
contemporary commercial practice.
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ized religion, is equally undeniable. This article thus provides but one example
of the contemporary Muslim experience.
A. General Commercial Practice
In the first place, it is important to note that the nature of this practice in-
volves a finite number of retail merchants operating stores and shops in a con-
fined area where each knows the other, and his 197 family, quite well. All of the
merchants are either sole proprietors or family owned storefronts, with possibly
a small number of laborers hired to perform any variety of routine tasks. The
proximity and relationships alter the nature, though not the extent, of the compe-
tition between the merchants. Agreements on paper are common, though the
merchants often seek the presence of two witnesses'98 as well, and rely almost
as much on the witnesses as on the terms of the paper in subsequent disputes.
Transactions are overwhelmingly done in cash, and delivery made on the spot.
Payment is almost never made prior to inspection of goods, and may be done
considerably afterwards.
Disputes tend to be relatively rare. Mediation is by far the most common
form of dispute resolution, with the mediation being either through the parties'
respective clans, or, if the dispute is serious or technical enough, through one of
the more experienced merchants in the bazaar to whom disputes are often re-
ferred. It is not uncommon for the mediator to effectively become an arbitrator
of sorts, and rule against a particularly recalcitrant party. Compliance with the
ruling is almost inevitable, because the failure to comply with the ruling of a
more experienced merchant following a quasi-hearing would lead to some form
of ostracization. The second most common means of resolution and enforcement
of disputes are extralegal; generally speaking, physical threats of one kind or
another. Assaults on persons or premises are thus disturbingly common. These
tend to occur less when the question is the interpretation of a contract (such as
whether or not goods are conforming) and more when the question concerns the
unwillingness or inability of one party to satisfy his obligations. Though of
course one blends into the other, as for example the troubled merchant who in-
sists the goods he received are nonconforming and refuses to pay for them. Reli-
gious scholars are involved at least theoretically if, for example, a party wishes
to compel the sale of an item over which he has obtained security. Courts are
almost never involved.
197. The use of the masculine gender in this context is deliberate; I saw no female merchants
during my tours of these souqs, though female customers abounded.
198. There is some Islamic pedigree to this, in that the Qur'an exhorts the believers to have two
witnesses to any transaction involving a future obligation, or dayn. Qur'an 2:282. But generally
speaking the juristic rules do not emphasize such a requirement and merchants are more likely to
point out the logistical convenience of such a process rather than any sort of religious obligation as-
sociated with it.
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B. Structures of Commerce, Administrative Compliance, and the National Law
As a general matter, all merchants seem to broadly observe the national
law's requirements on title, registration and the like. Every merchant certainly
could produce a document of title to his own storefront when I asked, for exam-
ple, and, if his storefront was jointly owned with others (usually family mem-
bers), he could readily produce a document reflecting the company's name and
the nature of the partnership. In addition, contracts were in such cases often be-
tween the company, as a juridical person, and other parties, despite the fact that
the religious rules provided no indication that company personhood was accept-
able.
The form purchase and sale agreements are generally drafted by lawyers,
not jurists, as are documents evidencing receipt of payment. There does not
seem to be any sort of belief on behalf of the merchant class that the religious
laws do not contain a general theory of contract; more than once I was told I was
entirely wrong about this, though none could ever point me to any set of provi-
sions in juristic texts that could plausibly be called a general theory.
Moreover, it is worth noting that while no merchant ever claims to follow
state law in contravention of the shari'a, there clearly is, among this merchant
class, a sense of legitimacy bestowed upon the national law as representing the
collective will of the nation to which they owe political fealty. The best example
of this lay perhaps in their responses to the Company Law, and the 2004
Amendments thereto.
Generally speaking, as noted above, the vast majority of sole proprietor-
ships do not register their respective companies, and when I asked why, invaria-
bly the reply I received was that a "company" could not consist of one person,
for there would be no person with whom he could keep "company." They fur-
ther indicated that the law reflects this, and only permits more than one person
to form a company. Thus, if two brothers own a storefront together, they might
register a company, invariably in the form of a "joint liability company," similar
to a general partnership in terms of financial obligations of the joint owners, to
demonstrate their relative interests in the place. 99 For a single person, however,
this is unnecessary: clearly he owns his own business entirely.
This is an accurate reflection of the 1997 Company Law, 00 drafted, it
should be emphasized, in Ba'ath Iraq, at a time when the Shi'a were under se-
vere persecution.2 0' It is not an accurate reflection, however, of the law after
March of 2004, as amended by the Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA"), the
American-run agency responsible for administering Iraq after the fall of Saddam
Hussein and before the transition of power from the United States back to a sov-
199. See IRAQ COMPANY LAW, supra note 128, at art. 6(3).
200. Id. at arts. 5, 6.
201. See LARRY DIAMOND, SQUANDERED VICTORY 5-6 (2005) (describing the persecution of
Shi'a).
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ereign Iraqi government. 20 2 The CPA Amendments grant far more expansive
rights to individuals to form companies and expand greatly the ability of compa-
nies of all types to seek limited liability. 20 3 When I pointed this out to the mer-
chants, I was met with firm objection. Merchants insist by and large that the law
has not really changed, or that the change is illegitimate, or that it will be
promptly reversed. Moreover, it is, they insisted, clearly against the spirit of the
Civil Code as well as the Company Law, suggesting legitimacy to those laws
lacking with respect to the CPA's revisions. Thus, while the merchant class has
thus incorporated a Saddam-era law into the nature of their dealings, they do not
recognize a CPA amendment thereto, even one that might work to any individ-
ual merchant's benefit by permitting him to seek the legal protection of limited
liability. 204
C. Finance and the Shari 'a
However, it is equally clear that when the national law permits something
that the shari'a unambiguously prohibits, the textile and book merchants I ob-
served tended to shun the provisions of the national law. This is particularly the
case in the area of finance, where, as noted above, the prohibition of interest has
been viewed as the centerpiece of an Islamic form of economics that is meant to
be more humane and less voracious than the American form supposedly is. Mer-
chants were as quick as any other class of devout Shi'a to mouth the platitudes
of the Islamic economic order, emphasizing that they gave loans without interest
for the sole purpose of "gains without limit" in the Hereafter, that where the
West considered the ultimate purpose of life to be the soulless accumulation of
material goods, they believed the purpose was to serve the Almighty God, and
that where in the West one devoured a weaker brother and defended this as
"survival of the fittest," in Islam he was supported in times of need, and weaned
back to health. Islam believed in the brotherhood, the West believed in nothing
but the individual accumulation of wealth. I do not recall meeting a merchant
who did not begin a conversation with a speech somewhat along these lines.
202. Hamoudi, Money Laundering, supra note 23, at 526.
203. CPA Order Number 64, Amendment to the Company Law No. 21 of 1997 with Annex A
(March 3, 2004) available at http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/regulations/20040305_CPAORD64_Amendment to-theCompany-LawNo.21_of 1997
_withAnnexA.pdf (last visited April 13, 2008)
204. Of course, given some of the mob-like extralegal means to which merchants often resorted
to exact payment of debt, discussed in this section, the limited liability principle would undoubtedly
be of very little consolation to any merchant seeking to avoid payment obligations. Moreover, there
may well be sound economic reasons why, in the context of such a closed commercial community
where relationships of trust are fundamental to the nature of the business relationship, the principle
of limited liability would not serve the community well. Others more schooled in economics than I
are more competent to address this. Nevertheless, the question of the legitimacy of the CPA orders is
central to understanding the reaction to the amendments to the Company Law.
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Once I permitted the rhetoric to end, however, and without disputing or in-
terrupting it (for that would only bring on more digression), the reality seemed
somewhat different. In the first place, when asked what charitable interest-free
loans they had given in the past year, few could produce very much by way of
documentary evidence of any, though some had indicated that a first cousin had
been lent $1000, or a second cousin's husband $500, which speak more to the
nature of close, extended family relations in Iraq relative to the United States
than anything having to do with broader commercial relationships. Nobody
seemed to loan money much beyond the family.
On further discussion, it seemed that the more common form of financing
was not a loan. The religious rules, not to mention the rhetorical comparison of
Western economics and its loans to the more generous Islamic model, made that
impossible. Rather, financing was done through a "sale" of one currency for an-
other, which, as was noted above, is entirely acceptable under Sistani's rules be-
cause it is a trade of one item for another, neither of which is weighable or
measurable by volume.2 0 5 Thus are unsecured "sales" of current Iraqi dinars for
future US dollars, 0 6 both extremely common forms of currency in Iraq in the
present day, quite common, at exchange rates that reflect interest rates that are
quite exorbitant, 33% per annum. 0 7
These specific types of loans were rarely made from one merchant to an-
other. Part of the reason may have been the entirely exploitative nature of the
interest rate, but part may also have been the reluctance of a bookseller or a car-
pet merchant to want to deal with currency speculation and repayment risks,
given that this is hardly the business he knows or understands. The job is there-
fore left to moneylenders. These individuals are far more likely to resort to vio-
lence to ensure repayment than use the other forms of dispute resolution de-
scribed above. As I left Iraq, I was told by some merchants that gangs linked to
Moqtada Sadr's Mahdi Army, the militia unit supposedly bringing Islamic rule
to regions under its control,20 8 had taken over the money lending practice in Ba-
205. MINHAJ, supra note 11l, vol. 2 at §234.
206. In addition, the direction of the sale, from dinar to dollar, places most of the currency risk
on the borrower, if one assumes that the dinar is more likely to collapse relative to the dollar than
vise versa.
207. The dinar to dollar exchange rate is 1500 to 1. For repayment of loans in one year's time, it
is generally made 1000 to 1, or an increase of 33%.
208. Concerning the Mahdi Army's sporadic efforts to institute supposedly Islamic rule, see
DIAMOND, supra note 201, at 211-12 (describing an incident involving Sadr's Shar'ia courts). The
Mahdi Army has, however, suffered a considerable loss of legitimacy from the fact that so many of
its members are engaged in mafia like gang activities that are rather far removed from Iraqis' con-
ception of what Islam is supposed to represent. See, e.g., Sabrina Tavemise, Relations Sour Between
Shi'ites and Mahdi Army, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007 at Al (reporting a story where a di-
vorced woman was killed by a Mahdi Army gang based on a baseless accusation that she was a pros-
titute, with her home then rented out by the gang that killed her).
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sra. Given the tactics of the Mahdi Army, 209 I could not safely verify this infor-
mation.
Given this, merchants tended to avoid moneylenders if they had the means,
and instead relied on secured loans, which merchants were more willing to offer.
The ease of obtaining security comes from a reliance largely on religious law to
the derogation of the national law, as the latter precludes the use of nonposses-
sory liens unless a document of registered title passes to the lienholder or some
other vague form of apparent possession is made, 210 an impossible task for
something like a book inventory. The religious law, by contrast, recommends
but does not require possession by a lienholder, and because it neither recog-
nizes explicitly the state law, nor does it have its own administrative infrastruc-
ture through which registrations may be made, there is no mention of documents
of registered title. 211 The religious rules do, however, suggest a communiqu6
(bayan) if there is any fear that the borrower will disclaim the presence of any
lien, and as a result, the communiqu6s are often issued, with two merchant wit-
nesses, which all but makes apparent and public to anyone within the souq that a
lien has been placed on a particular movable property. Given that nobody be-
yond the souq will take a nonpossessory lien that a court will never enforce,
there is no particular need for broader notice, and short of absconding with the
property and relocating to another city, it is difficult to see what a borrower
could do with the property that would be of detriment to the lienholder, other
than selling it to repay the debt, which he is permitted to do under the religious
rules with the permission of the lienholder.212 Thus, even though the religious
rules are extraordinarily poor at determining broader issues of registration and
perfection, this is hardly an issue in this particular context.
From my anecdotal experience, loans undertaken under such a secured me-
chanism carry "interest" at roughly half of the interest rate of that of the money-
lenders (that is repayment in a year's time at a rate of 1250 Iraqi dinars to the
dollar), and were therefore preferred by merchants. In addition, while fellow
merchants could and often did resort to the same tactics as moneylenders, the
potential to resolve disputes through clan intervention, or reference to a senior
merchant, were more likely than in the moneylender situation.
The religious rules also permit enforcement of a security interest through
reference to a cleric who could enforce a sale, and merchants insisted that this
was an available option, though none could point out an example in recent
memory where this was done. Rather, as a general matter, given the insular na-
ture of the souq, if the merchant could not pay, he surrendered the pledged in-
ventory. A merchant who had no free inventory might offer a car as security, or
209. For the reasons set forth supra note 208, 1 avoided any contact of any kind with the Mahdi
Army, which did limit my observations to a considerable extent.
2 10. See supra notes 141 and 142 and accompanying text for further explanation.
211. MINHAJ, supra note 111, vol. 2 at § 1031.
212. Id.at§1047.
2008
122 BERKELEYJ. OF MIDDLE EASTERN & ISLAMIC LAW Vol. 1:1
in more desperate circumstances, seek a loan from a moneylender. This type of
desperation was relatively rare for most merchants, who could rely on family
support, or a secured loan, in times of trouble. Still, it was common enough to
permit some to make a reasonably lucrative living out of money lending.
Thus, as this Section shows, once the myths of either some fantastical no-
tion of "pure" Islamic law or entire adherence to national law are discarded as
inadequate, a much more complete picture of commercial order emerges. This
picture, in the context of Iraqi merchant practice, shows how commerce, on the
basis of notions of legitimacy and functionality, carves its own form of order
from two separate bodies of law. It relies on the secular for basic form and struc-
ture, where the religious law is silent, and it turns to the religious rules when
their form and rhetoric demand adherence, though it relies on the formalisms of
the shari 'a to prevent such adherence from fettering commercial practice. Like-
wise, religious rules are employed when the national law simply cannot accom-
modate modem commercial practice, such as in the case of security, where the
religious rules and their reluctance to involve state concepts provide remarkable
flexibility. Thus, what emerges, ultimately, is neither Islamic economics, nor the
academic construction of classical juristic text, nor the manifestation of the rules
of a national code, but rather actual commercial practice, held together through
varied adherence to separate legal systems.
CONCLUSION
MUSLIM PLURALISM AND RAYS OF HOPE IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
It would be a mistake to suggest that all of our scholarship in the legal
academies is caught in deep denial of the reality of the legal order in the Muslim
world. Scholars arise continually who challenge these paradigms, if more im-
plicitly than I have. Russell Powell has written a fascinating piece on the devel-
opment of women's rights in Pakistan, contrasting this with comparable changes
in Catholic canon law, to show how and on what basis religious doctrine has
evolved in the two traditions.213 Playing an important role is the fact that reli-
gious doctrine remains purportedly the basis of Pakistani family law at least,
whereas civil law traditions in the Catholic world have largely jettisoned canon
law, thereby demonstrating one manner in which religious rules may be shaped
by their concretization in a particular time and place.21 4 Mark Cammack has
long written illuminating pieces of how Islamic law principles operate in con-
junction with other forces and influences within the broader legal culture of the
one country that is the subject of so much of his scholarship, Indonesia.21 5 While
213. See Russell Powell, Catharine McKinnon May Not Be Enough: Legal Change and Relig-
ion In Catholic and Sunni Jurisprudence, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2007).
214. Id. at 31-40.
215. See, e.g., Mark Cammack, Islam, Nationalism and the State in Suharto's Indonesia, 17
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much of Bernard Freamon's work on slavery focuses on the classical era, he not
only provides juristic rules, but also shows which rules were actually law, in that
they had some effect on the actual practices of a particular era, and which rules
bore no resemblance to classical practice 216 thereby making them, at least in the
context of the time and place which Professor Freamon is describing, hardly a
form of law as we understand the concept. Moreover, the subject of pluralism
and Islam has received considerable attention abroad, and a wonderful book was
published precisely on the subject of legal pluralism in the Arab world, with a
number of separately written pieces on the intersection of law and religion, and
the adoption of a pluralist model to explain them, from both sociological and le-
211gal perspectives.
One particular area in which the work concerning the relationship of reli-
gious rules to state rules has been the most promising is in the area of legal the-
ory. Mohammad Fadel, who has done groundbreaking work in Islamic political
philosophy and its relationship to Rawlsian liberal theory, 218 tries to address the
question of how to navigate the divide between the different but in some ways
overlapping systems of shari'a and state law. Fadel first indicates that there
should not be a problem with a state prohibiting activities permitted but not re-
quired by the shari'a, because these do not raise any particular questions of con-
science for a committed Muslim. 21 9 For example, rather than determine whether
the shari'a in fact implicitly prohibits polygamy (the liberal position) or permits
polygamy but discourages it (the conservative position), with a purpose to enact-
ing the "correct" interpretation, Fadel suggests that the state may pass any law
that it wants on the basis of public reason without necessarily deciding the inter-
pretive issue because it is not requiring either group to sin through violating
their own notions of shari'a. 220 This is because there is no general claim that Is-
lam requires polygamy, and thus a prohibition is not requiring a Muslim to
choose between the state and her religious obligation.221
Thorny problems do disappear when this is taken as a starting point. In
many, if not most, cases, compliance with both religious and legal standards is at
least technically possible. That is, while the state law may set the age of mar-
WIS. INT'L L.J. 27 (1999); Mark Cammack, Indonesia's 1989 Religious Judicature Act, Islamiciza-
tion of Indonesia or Indonesiazation of Islam?, 63 INDONESIA 143 (1997); Mark Cammack, Legis-
lating Social Change in an Islamic Society: Indonesia's Marriage Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 45
(1996).
216. Freamon, supra note 12, at 53-57 (describing the horrific nature of Muslim slave practice).
217. See generally LEGAL PLURALISM, supra note 8.
218. See. e.g., Mohammad Fadel, The True, The Good and The Reasonable: The Theological
and Ethical Roots of Public Reason in Islamic Law, 21 CAN. J. L. & JUR. 5 (2008).
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riage at eighteen and require the consent of the marrying parties, 222 and the reli-
gious rules suggest that a father or paternal grandfather may contract a child in
223marriage,  the believing family neither sins, nor commits a crime, by waiting
until a child is eighteen to secure a marriage for him or her, with their consent.
The religious rules do not, that is, require marriage at a younger age or without
consent, they merely permit it. I am not in a position to provide any evidence as
to the extent to which both state law and religious rules are followed by the pi-
ous in this regard. However, through years of living in Iraq, I can say with rela-
tive confidence that there is nothing at all unusual, and indeed among the urban
and pious I knew it was a universal practice, for marriages to be contracted after
the age of 18, and with the consent of all parties, and their parents, involved.
Similarly, while as noted above, the state law may permit the taking of interest
on a loan, and the religious rules prohibit it, nothing prevents the pious Muslim
from following the religious rules and complying with the law, given that noth-
ing in the law requires the taking of interest. This is precisely what happens in
commercial practice in Shi'i Iraq, as we have seen. This is not to suggest that
some problems do not remain, or that Fadel does not seek to address them, clear-
ly he does 224 , but that a significant number of problems concerning the recon-
ciliation of shari'a to state law can be eliminated entirely if the state were able
to enact legislation on the basis of public reason that neither prohibited a re-
quired practice, nor required a prohibited one.
Professor Abdullahi An Naim, who has made a central part of his current
work the necessary relationship of shari 'a to state law, offers a slightly different
approach. An Naim makes clear that he firmly believes that state law cannot be
based on the shari'a, as the shari'a is itself inherently uncertain and unknow-
able, given the diversity of viewpoints that are contained within it. 225 To particu-
larize his position through the lens of contemporary Shi'ism, Grand Ayatollah
Sistani is not the only mujtahid whom Shi'i laypersons may select as a source of
rules for Shi'ism; there are three other prominent Grand Ayatollahs in Najaf cur-
rently.226 To enact any one of their derivations of shari'a as the law seems fun-
damentally contrary to the nature of the institution of the marja 'iyya, where each
scholar has his own seminary and uses his own interpretive methods to reach
conclusions, with the institution as a whole, rather than any particular jurist, the-
reby preserving God's Will. Under such a system, it is the diversity of the sha-
ri 'a and not its uniformity that justifies its sanctity. In the words of Muhammad
Baqir al-Sadr, "legitimate interpretive effort [ijtihad] is the field on which [juris-
tic] disagreements lay. 227 Indeed, the destruction of the marja 'iyya in Iran is
222. Personal Status Law, supra note 133, at art. 7(1).
223. MINHAJ, supra note 111, vol. 3 at §§57, 60.
224. Fadel, supra note 219, at 18-19.
225. AN NAIM, supra note 66, at 13-14.
226. Hamoudi, Revolution, supra note 2 I, at note 94.
227. MUHAMMAD BAQIR AL-SADR, AL FATAWA AL WADIHA 21 (1977).
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precisely the result of juristic rule, with dissenting jurists being silenced by the
force of the state.228
An Naim therefore boldly calls for a reevaluation of the shari 'a away from
current Islamist considerations of it as a system of law and more towards a sys-
tem of moral rules of voluntary compliance. 229 State law in the nations with
Muslim majorities would then be based on what he terms "civic reason," acces-
sible to citizens of all religions. 230 An Naim accepts that a society's consensus
on legal and illegal behavior, on the basis of civic reason, will reflect Muslim
sensibilities, but believes that so long as the reasons proffered in the public
sphere are not based on God's Will but civic reason, this is not only unconten-
tious, but in fact consistent with the rights of citizens to their own self-
determination.23'
It is not my purpose to discuss each of these two eminent and admirable
scholars in any level of detail, but it should be clear from the above descriptions
that both Fadel and An Naim necessarily assume the dual identity of a Muslim
citizen, Muslim as to her own conception of shari'a, citizen as to the state. To
the lasting benefit of their readers, both devote significant intellectual energy
and consideration to the circumstances under which these might conflict and al-
so to manners of resolution. Their thoughts are careful, nuanced, and quite rele-
vant to the commercial practices described in this paper, demonstrating how Is-
lamic legal theories do retain significant relevance in the modem legal order of
Muslim societies, so long as they are willing to depart from the academic con-
struct of "Islamic law" to discuss real world issues and circumstances.
With the exception of particular CPA revisions to the Company Law,
whose manner of enactment was sufficiently unique and troublesome to merit
fair criticism, the Iraqi commercial actors never really disputed the legality of
the national law. None would take interest or pay interest; all considered this
prohibition (notwithstanding the nature of their alternative practices) to be fun-
damental to a better world order, but the idea that there was something illegiti-
mate or unacceptable about the law per se, merely because it was not drafted by
jurists, did not occur to them. They complied with law in any number of ways.
Even when they chose an alternative path, as in the systems respecting the pro-
curement of a security interest, there was nothing illegal about it, and the actors
themselves were well aware that they could not seek redress for their interests in
228. James Woolsey, WW IV: Who We Are Fighting and Why, 4 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 1,
7 (2004).
229. An Naim, supra note 66, at 28-30. To be clear, An Naim in calling for the separation of
"shari'a" from "law" is referring to law in the limited sense of "state law." My references in this ar-
ticle to pan-national Islamic law, or the Islamic "law" of commerce, are obviously not intended to be
taken as laws of the state but rather rules of social order to be considered in contradistinction to the
state law. This discrepancy in terminology brings our respective positions rather close together, not-
withstanding my repeated references to shari'a as a form of "law".
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the courts. The only purely extralegal (and illegal) actions had to do with the re-
sort to violence at times to enforce payment obligations in particular. This had
much less to do with the conflict of religious norms to legal norms, 232 and more
to the disturbingly high levels of defacto permissible violence generally in Iraq
for any number of reasons.
My understanding of Iraq, and its legal system, has thus been enhanced by
these thoughtful reflections, as my understanding of the legal order of other
Muslim societies, past and present, has been enhanced through reading the likes
of Cammack, Powell and Freamon. If only these hybrid approaches were under-
stood as the truest and most accurate representation of "Islamic law," our crisis
would pass. But instead the hybridizers, as I might call them, are the outliers,
law-mechanics whose true knowledge of the shari'a is supposedly limited by
our failure to understand the pure and unassailable logic of the academic con-
struct, even if its logic is no more foreign to us than it would be to most modem
Muslims. Nearly half a century after Professor Llwellyn parted from our world,
surely our academy should know that the life of the law is never so pure, nor so
logical.
232. 1 never asked, but I would be shocked if any cleric sanctioned such conduct to repay debt.
Certainly the religious rules nowhere sanction such conduct.
